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Block Exemption for Technology Licensing 
Agreements under Commission Regulation 
(EC) No. 240/96t 
Jianming Shen* 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 1, 1996, the long-awaited new block exemption for tech-
nology transfer transactions in the European Union (EU), entitled 
Regulation (EC) No. 240/96 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty [of Rome] to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agree-
ment (Regulation or new Regulation),l went into effect. After pro-
longed circulation for comment and harmonization of opinions 
among the Commissioners, this double-purpose EU "block exemption" 
regulation with respect to technology licensing agreements was finally 
approved by the Commission of the European Communities on Janu-
ary 31, 1996.2 The newly adopted legislation is designed to continue, 
combine, amend and replace the expired Regulation No. 2349/843 on 
patent licensing block exemptions (Patent Regulation) and Regulation 
No. 556/894 on know-how licensing block exemptions (Know-how 
t © Copyright 1996, 1997, Jianming Shen. 
* Kenneth Wang Research Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. SJD., 1994, 
University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., 1988, University of Pennsylvania; M.A., 1984, University of 
Denver; LL.B., 1983, Peking University. Former faculty member, International Law Institute and 
Faculty of Law, Peking University, Beijing, China. The author is thankful to his research assistants, 
Neil Axelrod and John Stahl, for their assistance in the research and writing of this article. 
I Commission Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty [of Rome] to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 1996 OJ (L 31) 2 
[hereinafter Reg. 240/96]. 
2 See Competition: Industry Heralds Victory in Battle over Technology Transfer, Transport Eur., Feb. 
20,1996, available in 1996 WL 8789229 [hereinafter Industry Heralds Victory]; Convergence, Policy, 
Regulatory Watch, WALL ST. J. (Eur.) , Mar. 18, 1996, at 32; Technology Transfer and Merger 
Regulations Set to be Approved, Eur. Rep.,Jan. 31,1996, available in 1996 WL 8661481 [hereinafter 
Technology Transfer]. 
3 Commission Regulation 2349/84 of July 23, 1984 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty [of Rome] to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 1984 OJ (L 219) 15 
[hereinafter Reg. 2349/84]. 
4 Commission Regulation 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of Article 85(3) of 
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Regulation). Like its predecessors, the new Regulation grants automat-
ic group exemption to patent and know-how licenses from the effect 
of the competition provisions of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty of Rome,5 
now incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 
1992.6 Significantly, the new Regulation shall remain in force until 
March 31, 2006,7 about four years longer than expected. 
Article 85 (1) of the Treaty of Rome declares illegal all agreements 
and practices which "may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the common market."8 Unlike the 
American rule-of-reason approach, EU competition law would thus 
automatically render contractual provisions or any conduct which has 
adverse effect on competition per se invalid.9 On the other hand, 
under Article 85(3) of the Treaty, certain restrictions on competition 
may be declared not subject to the prohibitions of Article 85 (1), i.e., 
they may be granted exemption from such prohibitions if such restric-
tions (a) contribute to "improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress," (b) provide 
consumers with "a fair share of the resulting benefit," (c) do not 
contain restrictions in excess of those which are "indispensable to the 
attainment of [the above] objectives," and (d) do not create the "pos-
sibility of eliminating competition. "10 
The well-known Regulation No. 17, which was adopted by the EEC 
Council of Ministers on February 6, 1962 mainly for the purpose of 
establishing a scheme for enforcing Articles 85 (prohibiting restric-
tions on competition) and 86 (prohibiting abuse of dominant posi-
tion) of the Treaty of Rome, provides the means for businesses to 
benefit under the exemptive provisions of Article 85(3),u To forestall 
any possible Commission action, undertakings may seek an individual 
the Treaty [of Rome] to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing Agreements, 1988 OJ. (L 61) 
1 [hereinafter Reg. 556/89]. 
5 TREATY ESTABI.ISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, opened for signature Nov. 23, 
1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. 
6 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 85(1), OJ. (C 224) 1, 
28, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 626-27 (1992). 
7 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 13. 
R EEC TREATY art. 85(1). 
9 See id. art. 85 (2). 
10 See id. art. 85(3). 
II See Council Regulation 17/62 of 21 February 1962 First Regulation Implementing Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1962].0. (13) 204 (EEC). 
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exemption by notifYing the Commission of the terms of any new12 or 
existing13 agreement, decision or concerted practice which falls within 
the scope of Article 85 (l) but may satisfY the exemptive requirements 
of Article 85 (3) . 
As a result of Regulation 17, the Commission received a flood of 
Article 85(3) notifications in the areas of, inter alia, patent and other 
technology licensing. To avoid being further overloaded with individ-
ual notifications from businesses respecting similar agreements and 
practices, the Commission sought from and was given by the Council 
the authority to adopt regulations to exempt certain classes of agree-
ments and practices from the general prohibitions of Article 85(1) for 
limited periods of time. The Commission thus issued the 1984 Patent 
Regulation and the 1989 Know-how Regulation. 14 
The 1984 Patent Regulation for patent licensing block exemptions 
was to expire on December 31, 1994, but was extended to June 30, 
1995,15 then to the end of 1995,16 and was further extended through 
March 31, 1996.17 The 1989 Know-how Regulation was to expire on 
December 31, 1999.18 With the new Regulation entering into effect, 
the Know-how Regulation was "repealed" as of April 1, 1996. 19 
The main purpose of the new Regulation is to continue to provide 
a safe harbor, without the need for individual notification, for certain 
categories of pure patent, pure know-how or mixed technology licens-
ing agreements under one common umbrella. The Commission rec-
ogmzes: 
[Both] block exemptions ought to be combined into a single 
regulation covering technology transfer agreements, and the 
rules governing patent licensing agreements and agreements 
for the licensing of know-how ought to be harmonized and 
simplified as far as possible, in order to encourage the dis-
12 See id. art. 4(1). 
B See id. art. 5(1). 
14 See generally Reg. 556/89, supra note 4; Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3. 
15 See Recent Development, EC Extends Patent Licensing Regulation, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Dec. 
1994, at 29, 29. 
16 See Commission Regulation Amending Regulation No. 2349/84/EEC on the Application 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing, art. 1, 1995 OJ. (C 141) 
5,5. 
17 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 11(2). 
18 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 12. 
19 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 11(1). 
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semination of technical knowledge in the Community and to 
promote the manufacture of technically more sophisticated 
products. In those circumstances Regulation (EEC) No. 
556/89 should be repealed.20 
According to the Commission, certain license restriction provisions, 
including exclusive rights, "generally contribute to improving the pro-
duction of goods and to promoting technical progress," and provide 
incentives for patentees and holders of know-how "to grant licenses" 
and for licensees "to undertake the investment required to manufac-
ture, use and put on the market a new product or to use a new 
process. "21 
As in the two predecessor Patent and Know-how Regulations, the 
core provisions in the new Regulation are those of Articles 1 through 
4. Most commentators have traditionally divided the relevant articles 
in these regulations into three lists of obligations or practices: the white 
list, the grey list, and the black list, respectively representing permissi-
ble, questionable and prohibited licensing obligations or practices. 
However, there has been some confusion about which represents what. 
While a considerable number of commentators have viewed Article 1 
of these regulations as the "white list," Article 2 as the "grey list," and 
Article 3 the "black list, "22 others have allocated the provisions among 
these lists differently. One variant approach is to treat Article 2 as the 
white list, Article 3 as the black list, and Article 4 as the grey list.23 
Another approach considers that Article 1 represents the white list, 
Articles 3 and 5 the black list, and Article 4 the grey list. 24 A further 
variant approach deems Article 1 as the grey list, Article 2 the white 
list, and Article 3 the black list. 25 
20Id. recital (3). 
21 Id. recital (12). 
22 See generally Joel N. Bock, The EEC Treat: Patent Rights v. Free Trade, 26 N.Y.U.]. INT'L L & 
POL. 285 (1994); Randolph W. Tritell & Lori E. Lesser, European Commission Proposes New Block 
nxemptionfor Technology Transfer Agreements,]. PROPRIETARY RTS., Aug. 1994, at 2. 
23 See, e.g., David Perkings, The European Community's Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE 1995, at 955 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks 
and Literary Property Handbook Series No. G-416, 1995) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]. 
24 See, e.g., Howard W. Fogt,Jr. & Ilene K. Gotts, The Antitrust and Technology Transfer Licensing 
Interface: A Comparative Analysis of Current Developments, 13 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw 1 (1995). 
25 See, e.g., Walter N. Kirn, Licensing in the EEC, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION 
1993, at 317 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Handbook Series No. 
G-354, 1993). 
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A careful examination of the new Regulation and its two predeces-
sors reveals that the practices listed under Article 1 and Article 2 are 
either exempted from or not prohibited by Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty.26 Those under Article 3 are not exempted, and are specifically 
prohibited.27 Those under Article 4 are neither automatically prohib-
ited nor automatically exempted, and they may benefit from the ex-
emption provisions if the Commission, within a specified time after 
being notified of such intended practices, fails to raise any objection. 2H 
Article 5 relates to the exclusion of certain types of agreements which 
are beyond the scope of the Regulation, and has nothing to do with 
the black list. 29 The fact that the Regulation does not apply to these 
excluded agreements does not necessarily mean that they are prohib-
ited agreements; rather, they may well be, now or in the future, subject 
to and/or exempted by different regulations. For the purposes of this 
paper, therefore, the white list refers to Articles 1 and 2, the black list 
to Article 3, and the grey list to Article 4. 
I. SCOPE OF ApPLICATION 
A. Included Agreements 
The new Regulation applies to the following categories of technol-
ogy transfer agreements: (a) agreements solely for the licensing of 
patents ("pure" patent licensing agreements); (b) agreements solely 
for the licensing of know-how information and technology ("pure" 
know-how licensing agreements); and (c) agreements for the licensing 
of both patented technology and non-patented know-how (the so-
called "mixed" patent and know-how licensing agreements) .30 The 
scope of applicability of the Regulation extends to certain other types 
of technology transfer agreements as well. 
l. Patent and/or Know-how Licensing Agreements 
Patent licensing agreements covered by the new Regulation denote 
"agreements whereby one undertaking which holds a patent ... per-
mits another undertaking ... to exploit the patent thereby licensed 
26 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art~. 1-2. 
27 See id. art. 3. 
2R See id. art. 4. 
29 See id. art. 5. 
30 See id. recital (4), art. 10(6). 
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... in particular for purposes of manufacture, use or putting on the 
market. "31 The term "patent" includes patents granted under the pat-
ent system of any individual Member State of the EU, under the 1975 
Community Patent Convention, or under the 1973 European Patent 
Convention.32 Also deemed to be patents are patent applications, utility 
models, applications for registration of utility models, topographies of 
semiconductor products, certificats d 'utilite and certificats d 'addition un-
der French law, applications for such certificats d 'utilite and certificats 
d'addition, supplementary protection certificates for medicinal prod-
ucts or other products for which such supplementary protection cer-
tificates may be obtained, and plant breeder's certificates.33 The new 
Regulation further applies to agreements for the licensing of an "in-
vention" if an application for "patent" (in its broader meaning) is filed 
within the period of time from the date of the licensing agreement set 
by the applicable national law or international convention.34 
With respect to patent licenses, the Commission continues that "it 
is possible to define a category of licensing agreements covering all or 
part of the common market which are capable of falling within the 
scope of Article 85 (1) but which can normally be regarded as satisfYing 
the conditions laid down in Article 85(3), where patents are necessary 
for the achievement of the objects of the licensed technology by a mixed 
agreement. "35 It is not clear whether the requirement that the licensed 
patents be essential to the achievement of the agreement's objectives 
is intended to apply merely to mixed agreements or to both mixed 
agreements and pure patent licensing agreements. It may be noted 
that in the September 1994 draft of the Commission's proposed regu-
lation (1994 Draft Regulation or 1994 Draft), the relevant paragraph 
relating to the above requirement did not contain the words "by a 
mixed agreement."36 Absent those words, the 1994 Draft could well 
31 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (5). 
32 See id. recital (4). 
33 See id. art. 8(1). 
34 See id. art. 8(2). Note that in the 1984 Patent Regulation and the 1994 Draft Regulation, such 
patent application respecting an invention must be made "within one year" after the licensing 
agreement enters into effect, irrespective of any different time limits as may be required under 
national law or any applicable patent convention. See Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 10(2); 
Preliminary Draft Commission Regulation of 30 September 1994 on the Application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, art. 8(2),1994 OJ. 
(C 178) 3, 12, reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 23, at 971,989 [hereinafter 1994 
Draft Reg.]. 
35 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (5) (emphasis added). 
36 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, recital (4). 
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indicate that the licensed patents had to be essential to achieving the 
objects of the licensed technology in both pure patent agreements and 
mixed agreements. If that was the intention of the Commission, then 
the addition of the words "by a mixed agreement" in the newly adopted 
Regulation would appear unnecessary and misleading. Thus, those 
words seem to have been added on purpose, possibly indicating that 
only in mixed licensing agreements are patents required to be neces-
sary for the achievement of the objectives of the licensed technology. 
It may be helpful to recall that in Regulation No. 2349/84, covering 
patent licensing agreements, a similar requirement was contained only 
in the context of exemptible agreements covering know-how as well as 
patents, where it is provided that agreements involving the licensing 
of know-how (and patents as well) were to be covered by that Regula-
tion "only in so far as the licensed patents are necessary for achieving 
the objects of the licensed technology .... "37 
Know-how licensing agreements covered by the new Regulation are 
those "whereby one undertaking which holds ... know-how ... com-
municates the know-how to" another undertaking for the same pur-
poses as patent licensing agreements. 38 "Know-how" is defined to com-
prise "non-patented technical information such as descriptions of 
manufacturing processes, recipes, formulae, designs or drawings."39 
For the purpose of the new Regulation, "know-how" must be "secret, 
substantial and identified in any appropriate form," and the terms 
"secret," "substantial" and "identified" are further defined in separate 
paragraphs.40 
2. Agreements Containing Ancillary Provisions Involving 
Other Rights 
The new Regulation's scope of application is also extended to pure 
or mixed patent and/or know-how licensing agreements with "ancil-
lary" provisions. These provisions involve the additional licensing of 
other types of intellectual property rights such as "trademarks, design 
rights and copyrights, especially software protection," provided that 
"such additional licensing contributes to the achievement of the ob-
jects of the licensed technology .... "41 To be ancillary, the provisions 
37 Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, recital (9). 
38 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (5). 
39Id. recital (4). 
40Id. art. 10(1)-(4). 
41Id. recital (6). 
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regarding the exploitation of other intellectual property rights may not 
contain any "obligations restrictive of competition other than those" 
which are "also attached to the licensed know-how or patents and 
exempted under [the] Regulation."42 There was a similar requirement 
in the Know-how Regulation.43 
3. Agreements for the Assignment of Rights 
The new Regulation also covers agreements for the assignment of 
patents, know-how or both "where the risk associated with exploitation 
remains with the assignor," as in the case, for example, "where the sum 
payable in consideration of the assignment is dependent on the turn-
over obtained by the assignee in respect of products made using the 
know-how or the patents, the quantity of such products manufactured 
or the number of operations carried out employing the know-how or 
the patents."44 The Commission believes, because of the similarity be-
tween sale and exclusive license, and to avoid the possibility that "ex-
clusive licenses restrictive of competition" would evade the require-
ments of the new Regulation by presenting the licenses as assignments, 
that the distinction should be drawn on the basis of whether "the risk 
associated with exploitation" passes from the assignor or the licensor 
to the assignee or the licensee.45 Should such risk remain with the 
assignor or the licensor, the new Regulation should apply.46 
4. Other Agreements Covered 
In addition, the new Regulation is applicable to "agreements where 
the licensor is not the holder of the know-how or the patentee, but is 
authorized by the holder or the patentee to grant a licence. "47 This 
provision is comparable to Article 11 (1) of the Patent Regulation and 
Article 6 (1) of the Know-how Regulation.48 Also covered by the exemp-
tion of the new Regulation are "licensing agreements in which the 
rights or obligations of the licensor or the licensee are assumed by 
undertakings connected with them. "49 Again, this provision is an almost 
42 [d. art. 10(15). 
43 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, recital (2), art. 1 (1). 
44 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 6(2). Cf Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 6(2); Reg. 2349/84, 
supra note 3, art. 11 (2). 
45 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (9). Cf Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, recital (6). 
46 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (9). 
47 [d. art. 6(1); see also id. recital (9). 
48 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 6(1); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 11 (1). 
49 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 6(3). 
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verbatim restatement of the corresponding provisions in the two prede-
cessor Regulations.5o 
Where a licensing agreement otherwise covered by the new Regula-
tion contains obligations relating to both territories within the com-
mon market and territories beyond the EU, the involvement of non-EU 
territories does not affect the Regulation's applicability "to the obliga-
tions relating to territories within the common market. "51 This implies 
that in such an agreement, that portion of the obligations which relates 
to non-member countries only would not be covered by the Regula-
tion. However, the new Regulation will apply in an equal manner to 
those licensing agreements covering solely non-EU territories or cov-
ering both EU territories and non-EU territories if they have competi-
tive effects within the common market "which may fall within the scope 
of Article 85(1)."52 The corresponding provisions in the two predeces-
sor Regulations were virtually the same.53 
B. Agreements Excluded 
1. Pure Sales Agreements 
As under Regulation No. 2349/84 and Regulation No. 556/89, the 
block exemption under the new Regulation does not apply to agree-
ments solely for the purpose of sale of licensed products.54 The Com-
mission reasons that because the objective of the Regulation is "to 
facilitate the dissemination of technology and the improvement of 
manufacturing processes," it "should apply only where the licensee 
himself manufactures the licensed products or has them manufactured 
for his account," or, in the case of a licensed service, only where the 
licensee "provides the service himself or has the service provided for 
his account."55 It does not matter whether or not the licensee is also 
licensed to use confidential information supplied by the licensor to 
promote and sell the licensed product.56 
50 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 6(3); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 11(3). 
51 Reg. 240/96, supra note I, recital (7). 
52 [d. 
53 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, recital (4); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, recitals (4)-(5). 
54 See Reg. 240/96, supra note I, art. 5(5). 
55 [d. recital (8). 
56 See id. recital (8); see also Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, recital (5); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, 
recital (7). Note that under Regulation No. 556/89, despite a general exclusion of agreements 
solely for the purpose of sale, an exception is allowed if the licensor sells the licensed products 
for a preliminary period before the licensee begins production with the licensed technology. See 
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2. Franchising Arrangements Involving Marketing Know-How 
Like its predecessors, the new Regulation does not apply to "agree-
ments relating to marketing know-how communicated in the context 
of franchising arrangements."57 This exclusion, however, is stated in 
the recital part, i.e., the preamble, of the Regulation only, not in any 
of the articles. One may see no reason why the Commission could not 
have expressly provided in Article 5 or elsewhere in the Regulation for 
the explicit exclusion of franchising arrangements involving marketing 
know-how. 
3. Agreements Involving "Pooled Technologies" 
Also excluded from the Regulation are licensing agreements involv-
ing pooled technologies. Article 5 excludes licensing agreements "be-
tween members of a patent or know-how pool which relate to the 
pooled technologies. "58 Such agreements relating to pooled technolo-
gies will nonetheless be covered by the Regulation if they do not 
contain any territorial restrictions within the EU "with regard to the 
manufacture, use or putting on the market of the licensed products or 
to the use of the licensed or pooled technologies. "59 
4. Agreements Involving Competing Joint Ventures and Parents 
Similarly, the Regulation does not apply to "licensing agreements 
between competing undertakings which hold interests in a joint ven-
ture, or between one of them and the joint venture, if the licensing 
agreements relate to the activities of the joint venture."60 The exemp-
tion will nonetheless apply to licensing agreements between a technol-
Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, recital (5). The 1994 Draft Regulation similarly contains the following 
words: " ... [Elxcept where the licensor undertakes for a preliminary period before the licensee 
himself commences production using the licensed technology to supply the licensed products 
for sale by the licensee." 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, recital (7). Such wording, however, was 
apparently removed from the approved new Regulation. 
57 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (8). Cf Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, recital (5). Certain 
categories of franchising agreements are covered by exemption under a separate Commission 
regulation. See Commission Regulation 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Franchising Agreements, 1988 OJ. (L 359) 46. 
58 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (8), art. 5(1)(1). Cf Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, recital (5), 
art. 5(1)(1); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, recital (8), art. 5(1)(1). 
59 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 5 (2) (2). 
60 [d. art. 5(1) (2). Cf Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 5(1) (2); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 
5(1) (2) (in almost identical language). 
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ogy-providing parent to a joint venture and the joint venture, if the 
combined market share of the parent licensor and the joint venture 
licensee is "not more than 20%" for "a license limited to production," 
or "not more than 1 0%" for "a license covering production and distri-
bution."61 This exception, absent in the original texts of its predeces-
sors, was created and retained in accordance with a 1992 regulation 
which amended, inter alia, Regulation No. 2349/84 and Regulation 
556/89.62 The new Regulation contains an additional provision, which 
was absent in the 1994 Draft Regulation: the new Regulation will 
continue to apply for two consecutive financial years if the above-men-
tioned market shares "are not exceeded by more than one-tenth;" if 
such market shares are exceeded by more than one-tenth, the Regula-
tion will continue to apply for six months "from the end of the year in 
which the limit was exceeded."63 
5. Agreements for Reciprocal Licensing of Unrelated 
Technologies 
The exemption in the new Regulation does not cover reciprocal 
licensing agreements between competitors "in relation to the products 
covered by those agreements," i.e., agreements under which Competi-
tor A grants Competitor B a license to exploit A's patents and/or 
know-how, and in return Competitor B, either directly or "in separate 
agreements or through connected undertakings," grants Competitor 
A a license to exploit Competitor B's own patents and/or know-how 
"or exclusive sales rights."64 Such excluded reciprocal licenses denote 
those "arrangements in which a licence is granted in exchange for 
other licenses not related to improvements to or new applications of the 
licensed technology. "65 The Commission considers that these arrange-
ments, as well as franchising agreements involving marketing know-
how and agreements made in connection with joint ventures and 
patent pools, "pose different problems which cannot at present be 
61 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 5(2) (1). 
62 See Commission Regulation 151/93 of 23 December 1992 Amending Regulations (EEC) 
417/85, (EER) No. 418/85, (EEC) No. 2349/84 and 556/89 on the Application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Specialization Agreements, Research and Development 
Agreements, Patent Licensing Agreements and Know-how Licensing Agreements, arts. 3-4, 1993 
OJ. (L 021) 8, 10-11 (amending Article 5(2) of both Regulation No. 2349/84 and Regulation 
No. 556/89). 
63 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 5(3). 
64 See id. art. 5(1) (3). 
65 [d. recital (8) (emphasis added). 
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dealt with in a single regulation. "66 On the other hand, the exemption 
provided in the new Regulation remains applicable to those reciprocal 
patent and/ or know-how licensing arrangements if "the parties are not 
subject to any territorial restriction within the common market."67 
6. Agreements Involving Non-Ancillary Provisions on Other Rights 
Further, Article 5 (1) (4) of the new Regulation does not apply to 
"licensing agreements containing provisions relating to intellectual 
property rights other than patents which are not ancillary."68 When a 
technology transfer agreement is concluded mainly for the purpose of 
transferring intellectual property rights other than patents such as 
trademarks and copyrights, it would be out of the intended scope of 
application of the new Regulation even if the agreement may also 
involve the transfer of patents and/or know-how technology. There was 
no comparable provision in either the Know-how Regulation or the 
Patent Regulation for the specific exclusion of agreements containing 
non-ancillary provisions respecting trademarks, copyrights and other 
non-patent intellectual property rights. A similar outcome would en-
sue, however, under the extension of the scope of those two Regula-
tions to "patent licensing agreements containing ancillary provisions 
relating to trade marks,"69 or "those [know-how or mixed] agreements 
containing ancillary provisions relating to trademarks or other intel-
lectual property rights,"70 implying that agreements containing non-an-
cillary provisions relating to non-patent intellectual property rights 
would in fact be excluded. 
An express exclusion of such agreements appeared in Article 
5 (1)( 4) of the 1994 Draft Regulation, which provided for the non-ap-
plicability of the Draft to "licensing agreements of in tellectual property 
rights other than patents except where these licenses enable the better 
achievement oj the object oj the licensed technology and contain only ancil-
lary provisions."71 This provision ultimately became Article 5(1) (4) of 
the new Regulation, although the same principle is stated in slightly 
different expressions.72 At the very least, the above-emphasized words 
6ii Id. 
ii7 Id. art. 5 (2) (2). 
iiHReg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(4). 
ii9Id. recital (10). 
70 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, recital (2), art. 1 (1). 
71 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, art. 5(1)(4) (emphasis added). 
72 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 5(1) (4). 
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of Article 5 (l) (4) of the 1994 Draft Regulation would have the same 
effect as paragraph (6) of the recital part of the new Regulation.73 
C. Removal of Market Share Thresholds 
Ever since the 1994 Draft Regulation was circulated, one of the major 
concerns among industries and legal circles has been a prior proposal 
to limit the availability of the Article 1 exemption to undertakings 
below specified market shares only.74 Certain members within the Com-
mission tried to finalize a text which would have specified that compa-
nies concluding licensing agreements would only benefit from the 
block exemption if they did not have a dominant position on the 
market, not exceeding forty percent of market share. This proposal 
has been fiercely opposed by industries, experts on industrial affairs 
within the Commission, and legal commentators. The Draft of Septem-
ber 1994 stated: 
5. The exemption in paragraph 1 (1) of the obligation on the 
licensor not to grant other licences shall apply only where the 
licensee's market share does not exceed 40% at the time the 
agreement is concluded. 
6. The exemption of the obligations referred to in paragraph 
1 (4)-(6) shall apply only where the [licensee] which is pro-
tected by such obligations holds a market share of no more 
than 40% at the time the agreement is concluded.?-" 
Subject to such market share thresholds, the 1994 Draft would have 
continued the exemption of those obligations restrictive of competi-
tion but specifically exempted under the Patent and Know-how Regu-
lations, including restrictions on the licensor's licensing of additional 
licensees in the licensed territory, restrictions on the licensor's com-
peting directly with the licensee in the licensed territory, restrictions 
on the licensee's exploitation of the licensed technology in territories 
reserved for the licensor or other licensees, and restrictions on the 
licensee's ability to pursue active or passive sales in other licensees' 
territories. 76 
73 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
74 See, e.g., Industry Heralds Victory, supra note 2. 
75 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, art. 1 (5)-(6). 
76 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1 (1) (1)-(3), 1 (1) (5)-(6); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 
1(1)(1)-(3),1(1)(5)-(6). 
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An earlier draft regulation of May 1994 contained an even more 
complicated scheme on market share thresholds. 77 For example, under 
this earlier draft, an obligation on the licensor not to license others in 
the licensee's territory would have been exempted only if (a) the 
products made by the licensee did not exceed forty percent of the 
relevant product and geographic market for the products, and (b) the 
licensee was not a member of an oligopolistic market. 78 An oligopolistic 
market was defined as three or fewer undertakings having a combined 
share of over fifty percent, or five or fewer undertakings having a 
combined share of over two-thirds of the relevant market, where the 
licensee was among those three or five largest undertakings and the 
licensee's market share was at least ten percent.79 
The Commission in the September 1994 Draft stated that if domi-
nant firms were to secure exclusive licenses they might prevent access 
by third parties to the technology's market, and eliminate competition 
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.80 To avoid 
such a situation, the block exemption should not automatically apply 
to agreements where the licensor undertook to grant no other licenses 
for the licensee's territory, and the licensee's market share in products 
that can be substituted for the licensed products which were marketed 
by the licensee exceeded a certain threshold at the time the agreement 
77 See Preliminary Draft Commission Regulation of May 1994 on the Application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, art. 1 (5), quoted in 
Valentine Korah, The Preliminary Draft of a New EC Group Exemption for Technology Licensing, 16 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 263, 264 (1994) [hereinafter May 1994 Draft Reg.]. The text of Article 
1 (5) of the earlier draft read: 
The exemption in paragraph 1 (1) of the obligation on the licensor not to grant other 
licences shall apply only provided 
·that the licensed products manufactured by the licensee and other goods manufactured 
by him which are considered by users to be equivalent in view of their characteristics, 
price and intended use account for no more than 40% of the entire market in those 
products in the common market or a substantial part of it, and 
·that the parties are not operating on an oligopolistic market; it may be presumed that 
the market is an oligopolistic one if the parties and one other undertaking together 
hold a market share of more than 50%, or if the parties and no more than three other 
undertakings together hold a market share of more than two thirds. 
Id.; see also Tritell & Lessor, supra note 22, at 2. 
78 See May 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 77, art. 1 (5). 
79 See id. As to the reference to the licensee's 10% market share, see Ronald W. Davis & M.E. 
Johnston, Contrast or Convergence? The IP Guidelines and the New EU Technology Transfer Exemp· 
tion, 9 ANTITRUST 16, 18 (1995); Tritell & Lessor, supra note 22, at 5. 
80 See 1994 Draft. Reg., supra note 34, recital 11. 
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was concluded.S! The market share thresholds were designed to pre-
vent dominant undertakings deemed potentially capable of exercising 
market power individually or collectively from using exclusive licenses 
to deny access by third parties to technologies that they might desire.R2 
That aim could be achieved, however, only at a cost of considerable 
uncertainty. While undertakings exceeding those market share thresh-
olds would have remained free to seek an individual exemption, that 
process would be egregiously lengthy, burdensome, and uncertain. It 
would have been those undertakings with successful technologies suf-
ficient to reach the market share limits that would be the most ad-
versely affected. Under the 1994 Draft and the earlier draft, absent an 
individual exemption, licensors and licensees exceeding the thresholds 
would have lost the exclusivity and other protections offered by the 
block exemption.83 
Fortunately for industries, the proposal on market share thresholds 
has been deleted from the adopted text of Article 1 of the new Regu-
lation.84 The new Regulation no longer requires, as it did in the Draft, 
that the licensee must have less than a forty percent share of the 
relevant market covered by the licensed technology in order to benefit 
from the Article 1 exemption of the Regulation.85 This does not mean, 
however, that companies which are recipients of technology and have 
a market share exceeding forty percent may completely rest at ease, 
for that threshold may still be used by the Commission in assessing 
possible unjustifiable anti-competitive effects that an exemptible agree-
ment may have before it withdraws the benefit of exemption in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article 7.86 The Commission, in recital (26) 
of the new Regulation, states: 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
84 See Reg. 240/96, supra note I, art. 1. 
85 See Convergence, Policy, Regulatory Watch, supra note 2, at 32. 
86 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 7. Paragraph (1) of Article 7 provides: 
The Commission may withdraw the benefit of this Regulation ... where ... the effect 
of the agreement is to prevent the licensed products from being exposed to effective 
competition in the licensed territory from identical goods or services or from goods or 
services considered by users as interchangeable or substitutable in view of their charac-
teristics, price and intended use, which may in particular occur where the licensee's 
market share exceeds 40% .... 
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Where agreements exempted under this Regulation never-
theless have effects incompatible with Article 85(3), the Com-
mission may withdraw the block exemption, in particular 
where the licensed products are not faced with real competi-
tion in the licensed territory .... This could also be the case 
where the licensee has a strong position on the market. In 
assessing the competition the Commission will pay special 
attention to cases where the licensee has more than 40% of 
the whole market .... 87 
What a dominant undertaking can do, in order to avoid being 
caught by the Commission under Article 7, is to seek an expedited 
individual exemption through the use of what is known as the opposi-
tion procedure.88 Undertakings remain entitled "to apply in individual 
cases ... for exemption" even if their agreements are exempted by 
Articles 1 and 2, and "[t]hey can in particular notifY agreements oblig-
ing the licensor not to grant other licenses in the territory, where the 
licensee's market share exceeds or is likely to exceed 40%."89 In other 
words, upon such notification, it will be left to the Commission to 
"oppose" agreements within a certain time period. If the Commission 
fails to do so, then the licensed undertakings, despite their excessive 
dominant position, can assume their agreements qualifY for the block 
exemption. 
II. THE WHITE LIST: ARTICLES 1 AND 2 
It may be appropriate and necessary at the outset to clarifY one 
important point: according to some commentators, the "white list" lists 
practices or obligations that must be contained in a license agreement.90 
That assumption is a serious misunderstanding and misconstruction of 
the white list. No matter whether the "white list" denotes Article 1 or 
2 or both, there is nothing in the new Regulation or its predecessors 
which requires that the licensing agreement must contain some or all 
of the white-listed practices. "White list" provisions should simply rep-
Id. art. 7(1). 
87Id. recital (26); see also Technology Transfer, supra note 2. 
88 See infra notes 318-53 and accompanying text. 
89 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (27). 
90 See, e.g., Maria Sendra, A Comparative Study of the Relationship Between Innovation and the 
Patent/Antitrust Mechanisms of the United States and the European Union, 9 INT'!. TAX Bus. LAW 
382, 389-90 (1992) (stating, albeit in a different context, that "the white list consists of conditions 
[which the] parties must adopt in order to be eligible for an exemption."). 
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resent legal and/ or permissible, but in no sense required, obligations or 
practices. 
Thus, the term "white list" covers those practices which are restrictive 
of competition and therefore fall within the scope of Article 85 (1), but 
nonetheless satisfY the conditions of Article 85(3) for exemption, as 
well as those practices which are generally not restrictive of competi-
tion and therefore are not prohibited by Article 85 (1) per se. In other 
words, the white list represents legal or permissible obligations or prac-
tices that are either not barred by the competition rules of Article 
85 (1), or exempted from Article 85 (l) rules if they would have other-
wise been barred by such rules. As the white-listed obligations found 
in Articles 1 and 2 of the Regulation represent permissible or legal 
obligations and practices, they are declared as two blocks that are to 
be automatically exempted from the Union's competition rules and/or 
from the complex individual notification requirements. The Commis-
sion clearly states in the preamble of the Regulation that agreements 
or clauses "which come within the terms of Articles 1 and 2 and which 
have neither the object nor the effect of restricting competition in any 
other way need no longer be notified. "91 
A. Exempted Obligations Restrictive of Competition 
Article 1 of the new Regulation, as part of the white list, contains the 
basic provisions for the block exemption of certain types of permissible 
obligations that may appear in technology transfer agreements.92 These 
obligations are considered to be restrictive of competition within the 
common market and therefore fall within the scope of prohibited 
practices under Article 85 (1), but because they also satisfY the condi-
tions of Article 85(3), they are declared to be exempted from Article 
85 (1) .93 Specifically, under Article 1 (1), and subject to specified condi-
tions, the following obligations are automatically exempted: 
(1) Territorially exclusive licenses excluding third party licen-
sees; 
(2) Territorially exclusive licenses excluding the licensor; 
(3) Restrictions on exploitation in the licensor's territory; 
(4) Restrictions on manufacture or use in territories which 
have been licensed to other licensees; 
91 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (27). 
92 See id. art. 1. 
93 See id. 
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(5) Restrictions on active sales in territories licensed to other 
licensees; 
(6) Restrictions on passive sales in territories licensed to other 
licensees; 
(7) Obligations to use the licensor's trademark or get up; 
(8) Restrictions on quantities of the licensed product used for 
manufacturing different products.94 
The Commission considers that the above types of obligations fulfill 
one important aspect of the conditions for the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty of Rome, i.e., they "generally contribute to improv-
ing the production of goods and to promoting technical progress. "95 
With these restrictions, the patentees or the holders of know-how will 
be "more willing to grant licences," while prospective licensees will be 
"more inclined to undertake the investment required to manufacture, 
use and put on the market a new product or to use a new process. "96 
These restrictions, continues the Commission, also satisfy the remain-
ing conditions for exemption under Article 85(3), in that consumers 
"will, as a rule, be allowed a fair share of the benefit resulting from the 
improvement in the supply of goods on the market."97 Article 1 (5) 
provides that "[t]he exemption provided for in paragraph 1 shall also 
apply where in a particular agreement the parties undertake obliga-
tions of the types referred to in that paragraph but with a more limited 
scope than is permitted by that paragraph. "98 
l. Territorial Protections to Exclude Other Licensees 
Under Article 1 (1)(1) of the new Regulation, Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty shall not apply to a pure or mixed technology licensing agree-
ment between "two undertakings" that contains "an obligation on the 
licensor not to license other undertakings to exploit the licensed tech-
nology in the licensed territory."99 Except for a minor and necessary 
change in wordings, this provision is virtually identical to its counter-
parts in the prior Paten t and Know-how Regulations. 100 The essence of 
a license comprises the right to exploit, exclusively or non-exclusively, 
94 See id. art. 1(1) (1)-(8). 
95 [d. recital (12). 
'l6Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (12). 
97 [d. recital (17). 
98 [d. art. 1(5). 
99 [d. art. 1(1)(1). 
100 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1 (1) (1); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 1 (1) (1). 
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the intellectual property rights so licensed. The right to exploit in-
cludes "any [exclusive or non-exclusive] use of the licensed technology 
in particular in the production, active or passive sales in a territory 
even if not coupled with manufacture in that territory, or leasing of 
the licensed products. "101 
The Commission recognizes that this type of exclusive license obli-
gation, among others, may not be in itself incompatible with Article 
85(1) if it introduces and protects a new technology in the licensed 
territory by virtue of (a) the degree of the research which has been 
undertaken; (b) the degree of the increase in the level of competition 
in general and inter-brand competition in particular; and (c) the 
degree of the competitiveness of the parties to the agreement resulting 
from the dissemination of innovation within the common market. 102 If 
such an exclusive license does, however, fall within the scope of Article 
85 (1) of the Treaty in other circumstances, it should nonetheless be 
exempted under Article 1 of the Regulation. 103 
According to Article 1, paragraph 2 of the new Regulation, if "the 
agreement is a pure patent licensing agreement, the exemption of [the 
obligation regarding territorially exclusive license] ... is granted only 
to the extent that and for as long as the licensed product is protected 
by parallel patents, in the territories ... of the licensee."104 This re-
quirement is in effect somewhat different from that in Article 1 (1) (1) 
of the Patent Regulation, which merely required that "one of the 
licensed patents [remain] in force. "105 The ambiguity inherent in the 
latter could be interpreted in two ways: either that one of licensed 
patents had to remain in force in the licensee's territory (as well as the 
licensor's territory), or that it would suffice if such licensed patent 
remained in force in the licensor's territory. This uncertainty is avoided 
by the amended language now found in Article 1 (2) of the new Regu-
lation, which certainly represents an improvement, and by a provision 
in the preamble which states that this kind of obligation is permitted 
only "in respect of territories where the licensed product is protected 
by patents."I06 
101 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 10(10). 
102 See id. recital (10). 
103 See id. 
104Id. art. 1 (2). 
105 Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(1). 
106Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (12). The legislative history of the new Regulation made 
this point clearer: "The Regulation should not apply to pure patent licensing agreements con-
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Under Article 1 (3) of the new Regulation, if "the agreement is a 
pure know-how licensing agreement," the practice of territorially ex-
clusive licensing excluding other potential licensees will be exempted 
for a period "not exceed[ing] ten years from the date when the li-
censed product is first put on the market in the Community by one of 
the licensees. "107 This ten year limit for pure know-how agreements is 
basically a restatement of a similar provision in Article 1 (2) of the 
Know-how Regulation. lOs The fourth sub-paragraph of Article 1 (3) of 
the new Regulation resembles Article 1 (3) of the Know-how Regulation 
in that both provide that the exemption regarding pure and exclusive 
know-how licenses shall apply only where the parties have identified 
the initial know-how and any subsequent improvements to it which 
become available to one party and are communicated to the other 
party pursuant to and for the purpose of their agreement, and only 
"for as long as the know-how remains secret and substantial. "109 
In the case of exclusive licensing agreements involving mixed patent 
and know-how technology, (a) if "the licensed technology is protected 
by necessary patents" in a Member State (i.e., a licensed territory), and 
(b) "if the duration of such protection exceeds the periods specified 
in paragraph 3" (i.e., if it exceeds ten years or a period of ten years 
minus the number of years for which the know-how has entered into 
the public domain), the duration of the exemption for territorial 
exclusivity may then be extended in that Member State "for as long as 
the licensed product [or process] is protected ... by such [necessary] 
patents. "110 The corresponding provision contained in the Know-how 
Regulation had the same effect although the wordings used therein 
were a little different. I 11 
"Necessary patents" are defined in the new Regulation as patents the 
license of which "is necessary for the putting into effect of the licensed 
technology insofar as, in the absence of such a licence, the realisation 
of the licensed technology would not be possible or would by [sic] 
possible only to a lesser extent or in more difficult or costly conditions," 
and which "must therefore be of technical, legal or economic interest 
taining obligations which limit the exploitation of the technology in Member States where there 
are no parallel patents." 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, recital (10) (emphasis added). 
107Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1(2)-(3). 
108 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1 (2). 
109 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1(3)(4); Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1(3). 
11OReg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1(4)(1). 
111 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1 (4). 
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to the licensee."112 Such a definition was not provided in the Know-how 
Regulation. 
Further, the obligation to exclude other licensees, among other 
obligations, in mixed agreements must meet one more condition in 
order to fully benefit from the exemption under Article 1 of the new 
Regulation. In order for the maximum allowable time limit to apply, 
either the patents must remain in force, or the know-how must be 
properly identified and continue to meet the standard of secrecy and 
substantiality. Within the time limit, the longer duration of protection 
between these two controls.113 
2. Territorial Protections Against Licensors 
Article 1 (1) (2) of the new Regulation exempts "an obligation on the 
licensor not to exploit the licensed technology in the licensed terri-
tory himself' from the prohibitions of Article 85(1) of the Treaty of 
Rome. 114 The two predecessor Regulations contained similar corre-
sponding provisions. ll5 An arrangement excluding the licensor from 
the territory of the licensee is just another aspect of an exclusive 
territorial protection that is intended to grant the licensee the sole 
right, even vis-a-vis the licensor, to exploit the licensed patents and/ or 
know-how within his or her territory. The Commission's reasoning as 
stated in recital (10) of the new Regulation applies equally to this kind 
of territorial exclusivity.IIG 
The exemption of the obligation excluding the licensor from ex-
ploiting the licensed technology in the licensee's territory is also sub-
ject to the same time limits as are applied to the exemption of exclusive 
territorial protection excluding other licensees. These time limits are: 
(a) in the case of a pure patent licensing agreement, the exemption 
will be in effect only for as long as the licensed product remains 
covered by parallel patents in the licensee's territory; (b) in the case 
of a pure know-how license, the obligation may not exceed ten years 
after the know-how was first marketed by any licensee, to the extent 
that the know-how remains secret and substantial and has been iden-
tified by the parties in an appropriate form; and (c) in the case of a 
mixed patent and know-how licensing agreement, the obligation may 
112Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 10(5). 
113 See id. art. 1(4)(3). 
114Id. art. 1 (1) (2); see also EEC TREATY art. 85(1). 
II" See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1 (l) (2); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 1 (1) (2). 
IIG See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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in no event go beyond the life of necessary patents if the life of such 
patents exceeds (i) the general ten-year know-how limit, (ii) a time 
limit shortened by the loss of secrecy and/or substantiality or by the 
lack of identification, or (iii) a time limit further shortened by the loss 
of both patent protection and know-how protection. ll7 
3. Territorial Reservations for Licensors 
As the two prior Patent and Know-how Regulations did, the new 
Regulation also permits "an obligation on the licensee not to exploit 
the licensed technology in the territory of the licensor within the 
common market."lls The new Regulation no longer uses the words 
"territories ... which are reserved for the licensor." There seems to be 
no reason, however, why one can not understand the terms "the terri-
tory of the licensor" as a territory which the licensor has reserved for 
himself or herself, to the exclusion of any licensee or licensees, for the 
exploitation of the patent and/ or know-how in question. ll9 
In order to benefit from the exemption, exclusive territorial protec-
tion clauses designed to exclude the licensee(s) from the territories 
within the EU reserved for the licensor must similarly meet certain 
conditions. First, where the clause concerns a pure patent license, the 
licensed product or technology must be "protected by parallel patents 
in the territories . .. of . .. the licensor," and the licensee's obligation 
may not exceed the duration of such patents. 120 Second, for a pure 
know-how license, the duration of the exemption is subject to the 
maximum ten-year limit, which can be shortened if the technology has 
been commercially used by prior licensees, provided that during such 
time limit, the know-how does not become public knowledge and it is 
properly identified by the parties. 121 If, for example, the licensed goods 
or services, the production or provision of which requires the use of 
the licensed know-how, have been put on the market by Licensee X as 
the first marketer for five years, Licensee Y may then be required to 
refrain from exploiting the know-how in Licensor's territory for only 
117 See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text. 
118 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1(1)(3). Cf Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1(1)(3); Reg. 
2349/84, supra note 3, art. 1 (1) (3). 
119The 1994 Draft Regulation continued to use "territories within the common market which 
are reserved for the licensor." 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, art. 1(1)(3). It is not known why 
the Commission changed the wordings in the adopted text, perhaps for reasons of simplicity. In 
any event, changes such as this are matters of drafting technique, not of substance. 
120 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1 (2) (emphasis added). 
121 See id. art. 1 (3). 
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up to five additional years. Should the know-how enter the public 
domain two years prior to the expiration of the ten-year limit, Licensor 
would then be entitled to a maximum period of eight years of exemp-
tion vis-a-vis Licensee X, but only three years of such exemption vis-a-vis 
Licensee Y. Third, where the clause involves a mixed agreement, while 
the licensee's obligation may be extended beyond the exemption pe-
riods for pure know-how licenses by the existence of longer-duration 
parallel patents, that obligation, whether or not so extended, may be 
exempted "only for as long as the patents remain in force or to the 
extent that the know-how is identified and for as long as it remains 
secret and substantial whichever period is longer. "122 
4. Territorial Reservations for Other Licensees 
Points (4) through (6) of Article 1(1) of the new Regulation are 
comparable to the corresponding provisions in the predecessor Regu-
lations. These points concern arrangements designed to protect the 
interests of other licensees in their own licensed territories. 123 In other 
words, the licensor may agree to license the technology to a particular 
licensee on the condition that the latter does not exploit the technol-
ogy in territories where other licensees have been granted a license to 
exploit it. However, the degree of protection appears to be different 
between the marketing aspect and other aspects of exploitation. There-
fore, they are treated separately in three provisions. 
Article 1 (1) (4) deals with restrictions on the production or use 
aspects of exploitation, providing for the exemption of "an obligation 
on the licensee not to manufacture or use the licensed product, or use 
the licensed process, in territories within the common market which 
are licensed to other licensees. "124 The same conditions and duration 
of exemption apply to this obligation as those discussed in the contexts 
of exclusive territorial protection to exclude other licensees and/or 
the licensor from exploiting the licensed technology in the licensed 
territory, and of protection to exclude the licensee from exploiting the 
same in territories which are reserved for the licensor himself or 
herself. 
As to the marketing aspect of exploitation, the Regulation and its 
two predecessors distinguish between active marketing and non-active 
122Id. art. 1(4). 
123 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1 (4)-(6). 
124Id. art. 1 (1)(4). Cf Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1 (1)(4); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 
1(1) (4). 
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marketing by allowing the licensor a much shorter duration of exemp-
tion for restricting the licensee from passively selling the licensed 
product in territories of third licensees. Article 1 (1) (5) exempts "an 
obligation on the licensee not to pursue an active policy of putting the 
licensed product on the market in the territories within the common 
market which are licensed to other licensees."125 Examples of activities 
in pursuit of such a policy include the engagement "in advertising 
specifically aimed at those territories," the establishment of "any 
branch" in such territories and/or the maintenance of "any distribu-
tion depot there. "126 The restriction on these active marketing activities 
benefits from the same duration of exemption as that available to 
restrictions on the production or use activities of the licensee in the 
territories of other licensees. In other words, such restrictions are 
exempted for as long as the parallel patents remain in force in the case 
of a pure patent license, or for up to ten years for a pure know-how 
license while the know-how remains secret and substantial. In the case 
of a mixed license, the restrictions are exempted for the longer period 
of the life of the necessary patent, or the life of secrecy and substanti-
ality of the appropriately identified know-how within the permissible 
time limits. 
Under Article 1 (1)(6), it is permissible for the parties to include in 
their licensing agreement "an obligation on the licensee not to put the 
licensed product on the market in the territories licensed to other 
licensees within the common market in response to unsolicited orders."127 
This exemption is subject, however, to stricter limitations. Article 1 (2) 
provides that in the case of a pure patent license, the 
exemption of the obligation referred to in point (6) of para-
graph 1 is granted for a period not exceeding five years from 
the date when the product is first put on the market within 
the common market by one of the licensees, to the extent 
that and for as long as, in these territories, this product is 
protected by parallel paten tS.128 
Similarly, where the agreement is a pure know-how license, the dura-
tion of exemption for this kind of obligation may not exceed five years 
after the licensed product is first placed on the market in the EU by 
125Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1 (1)(5). 
126Id. Cf Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1(1)(5); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(5). 
127 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1 (1) (6) (emphasis added). 
128 Id. art. 1 (2) (emphasis added). 
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any of the licensees, and the know-how during that maximum five-year 
period must be properly identified and remain secret and substan-
tial. I29 The duration of such protection in the case of a mixed agree-
ment "may not exceed the five-year period" either, and only for so long 
as the patent remains in force or the properly identified know-how 
remains secret and substantial, whichever is longer. 13o The Commission 
is of the position that while the obligation on the licensee not to market 
the licensed product in the domains licensed to other licensees should 
be exempted, 
the permitted period for such an obligation ... should ... 
be limited to a few years from the date on which the licensed 
product is put on the market in the Community by a licensee, 
irrespective of whether the licensed technology comprises 
know-how, patents or both in the territories concerned.131 
Further, there exists a danger that this exemption, even if within the 
five-year time limit, may be withdrawn should the Commission find that 
"the licensee refuses, without any objectively justified reason, to meet 
unsolicited orders from users or resellers in the territory of other 
licensees. "132 
According to the Commission, the obligation referred to in Article 
1 (1) (6) "would ban not just active competition but passive competition 
too. "133 Since the restriction on active marketing competition is already 
covered by a longer period of exemption under Article 1(1)(5) and 
other related provisions, it is not necessary for Article 1 (1)( 6), which 
ensures a shorter duration of protection, to cover both active and 
passive marketing competition. The reference in Article 1 (1) (6) to the 
phrase "in response to unsolicited orders" may appropriately be inter-
preted as excluding active marketing competition.134 It may be noted 
that neither the Patent Regulation nor the Know-how Regulation con-
tained the words "in response to unsolicited orders. "135 The addition 
of these words in the new Regulation makes it clearer that the words 
"putting on the market" in the context of Article 1 (1) (6) refer solely 
129 See id. art. 1(3)(2), (4). 
130 [d. art. 1 (4) (2), (3). 
131 [d. recital (15). 
132Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 7(2). 
133 [d. 
134 [d. art. 1(1)(6). 
135 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1(1)(6); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(6). 
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to passive selling activities, and therefore do not include any active 
activities to "put the licensed product on the market. "136 
5. Mandatory Use of Trademarks; Lawful Quantity Restrictions 
Article 1 (1) (7) of the Regulation exempts "an obligation on the 
licensee to use only the licensor's trademark or get up to distinguish 
the licensed product during the term of the agreement, provided that 
the licensee is not prevented from identifYing himself as the manufac-
turer of the licensed products. "137 This is almost identical to its corre-
sponding provision in both the Patent and Know-how Regulations. 138 
Requiring the licensee to use only the trademark or get up determined 
by the licensor resembles the tying of unrelated obligations. However, 
if the licensor considers such trademark or get up necessary for iden-
tifying and distinguishing the licensed product from other competitive 
products, then he or she is allowed to restrict the licensee to using only 
designated trademark or get up. In no event may the licensor prohibit 
the licensee from indicating that the latter is the manufacturer of the 
licensed product, even if such product has to bear the trademark or 
get up of the former. 
Under Article 1 (1) (8) of the new Regulation, an obligation may be 
imposed on the licensee 
to limit his production of the licensed product to the quan-
tities he requires in manufacturing his own products and to 
sell the licensed product only as an integral part of or a 
replacement part for his own products or otherwise in con-
nection with the sale of his own products, provided that such 
quantities are freely determined by the licensee. 139 
This is a restatement of Article 1 (1) (8) of the Know-how Regulation. 140 
There was no comparable provision in the Patent Regulation. 
The obligation mandating the use of the licensor's trademark or get 
up, and the obligation limiting the licensee's production to quantities 
necessary for the manufacture of derivative products, are commonly 
1~6SeeReg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1(1)(6); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(6). 
137Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1(1)(7). 
138 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1 (1) (7); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 1 (1)(7). 
139Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 1(1)(8). 
140 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 1 (1) (8). Article 1 (1) (8) of the Know-how Regulation was 
worded exactly the same as Article 1 (1) (8) of the new Regulation. See Reg. 240/96, supra note 
1, art. ](1)(8). 
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subject to some conditions which are, in part, different from those for 
the exemption of other obligations. Where the agreement concerns a 
pure patent license, the conditions are the same as those for exclusive 
territorial protection, namely, the licensed product or the licensed 
process must continue to be protected by parallel patents in the terri-
tory of the licensee in order for the obligations to benefit from the 
exemption. 141 In the case of a pure know-how licensing agreement, 
however, the ten year limit does not apply to the obligations referred 
to in Article 1 (l) (7) and (8) .142 Rather, such obligations "are exempted 
for the lifetime of the agreement for as long as the know-how remains 
secret and substantial. "143 
The duration of the agreement as a whole may be longer than ten 
years even if some of the obligations discussed earlier may not be 
imposed for more than ten years upon the initial marketing of the 
licensed product using the licensed know-how. Assuming, for example, 
that in a pure know-how license agreement which has a term of twenty 
years in its entirety, the licensee will be the first one to put the licensed 
product on the market. The agreement would contain a clause which 
would obligate the licensor to refrain from licensing other licensees to 
exploit the licensed know-how, or exploiting the same himself or her-
self (Clause A). It would also include a clause requiring the licensee 
to use the licensor's trademark only while allowing the licensee to 
identify himself or herself as the manufacturer (Clause B). Under the 
Regulation, Clause A would be exempted for a maximum of only ten 
years, whereas Clause B could benefit from the exemption for up to 
twenty years-the lifetime of the agreement-unless such a period is 
shortened by the loss of secrecy and/or substantiality in the know-
how.144 
B. Permissible Obligations Not Restrictive of Competition 
Article 2 of the new Regulation contains a non-exhaustive list of 
practices which in the opinion of the Commission are generally not 
restrictive of competition, but may nonetheless be exempted in case 
they are in fact found to have an anti-competition effect. 145 The Com-
mission reasons that 
141 See id. art. 1 (2) (referring to points (7) and (8) of Article 1 (1». 
142 See id. art. 1 (3)(3). 
143Id. (emphasis added). 
144 See id. art. 1 (3) (3). 
145 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2. 
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[iJt is desirable to list in [the] Regulation a number of obli-
gations that are commonly found in licensing agreements but 
are normally not restrictive of competition, and to provide 
that in the event that because of the particular economic or 
legal circumstances they should fall within Article 85 (l), they 
too will be covered by the exemption.146 
Under paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the new Regulation, the obligations 
and practices which are considered "generally not restrictive of com-
petition" include the following: 
(l) an obligation not to disclose confidential know-how even 
after the expiration of the agreement; 
(2) a restriction on sub-licensing or assignment; 
(3) a restriction on post-term exploitation; 
(4) non-exclusive reciprocal grant-backs on improvements of 
the licensed technology; 
(5) an obligation to observe minimum quality specifications 
or to procure tied goods necessary for proper exploitation; 
(6) a duty to cooperate regarding misappropriation of the 
licensed know-how or infringement of the licensed patent; 
(7) an obligation to continue paying royalties (a) within the 
term of the agreement if the know-how becomes public 
knowledge by actions of the licensee or other licensees, or 
(b) after the licensed patents expire if such an obligation is 
necessary to facilitate payment; 
(8) field of use restrictions; 
(9) requirements on minimum royalty payments or produc-
tion quantities; 
(10) most-favored-licensee requirements; 
(11) an obligation to indicate the licensor's name or the 
licensed patents; 
(12) a ban on the use of the licensed technology for the 
construction of facilities for third parties; 
(13) a restriction on the quantity of the licensed product that 
may be supplied to a particular customer in appropriate cir-
cumstances; 
(14) a reservation of the right under the patent monopoly to 
oppose the use of the patent by the licensee beyond the 
146Id. recital (18). 
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licensed territory; 
(15) a reservation of the right to terminate the agreement if 
status of know-how or validity of patents is contested or chal-
lenged; 
(16) a reservation of the right to terminate a patent license 
if the licensee claims that the patent is not necessary; 
(17) a best-effort exploitation requirement; 
(18) a reservation to terminate the exclusivity and to stop 
licensing improvements when the licensee competes with the 
licensor. 147 
279 
These types of obligations and practices do not have to be specifically 
exempted from Article 85 (1) if they are not restrictive of competition. 
Insofar as they are not covered by the competition rules (and other 
applicable EU or national law), they are per se legal and permissible, 
thus rendering exemption unnecessary. However, as Article 2(2) reit-
erates, "[i]n the event that, because of particular circumstances," the 
practices listed above "fall within the scope of Article 85 (1), they shall 
also be exempted even if they are not accompanied by any of the 
obligations exempted by Article 1. "148 This contingency exemption 
"shall also apply where an agreement contains clauses of the types 
referred to in paragraph 1 but with a more limited scope than is 
permitted by that paragraph. "149 
It is not clear whether the permissible practices listed in Article 2 
are subject to any time limits, and if so, what limits should apply. It is 
arguable that insofar as these practices are not restrictive of competi-
tion and therefore are not prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty, 
they may be considered not subject to any particular time limits, be-
cause in that event they themselves are not the targets of Article 85(1) 
prohibitions. They need not be exempted, because they are not prohib-
ited. Article 2 (1) of the new Regulation states that "Article 1 shall apply 
notwithstanding the presence" of any of the practices listed under 
Article 2.150 The reference to the entire Article 1 could mean, arguably, 
that the time limits of Article 1 (2) through (4) could also be applied 
to Article 2. In any event, some of the provisions of Article 2(1), e.g., 
post-term use ban and non-disclosure clauses, are themselves evidence 
147 See id. art. 2(1)(1)-(18). 
148Id. an. 2(2). 
149Id. art. 2(3). 
150 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1). 
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that they can operate for a duration longer than those permissible 
under Article 1.151 
l. Post-Term Non-Disclosure Obligations 
Under Article 2(1) (1) of the new Regulation, the licensor may im-
pose "an obligation on the licensee not to divulge the know-how 
communicated by the licensor," not only for the lifetime of the agree-
ment, but also for an indefinite period of time "after the agreement 
has expired. "152 This same permission was contained in Article 2 (1) (7) 
of the Patent Regulation, and Article 2(1) (1) of the Know-how Regu-
lation. I53 In a pure or mixed licensing agreement involving the com-
munication of know-how, it is only natural to expect that the licensor 
has a legitimate interest in requiring that the licensee protect the 
confidentiality of the licensed know-how during the term of the agree-
ment. Moreover, the licensee is further expected to continue to refrain 
from disclosing the know-how to third parties or to the public beyond 
the expiration of the agreement until the know-how loses its secrecy 
and/ or substantiality by actions not related to the licensee. 
2. Sublicenses and Assignment Restrictions 
It is permissible under Article 2(1) (2) of the Regulation for the 
parties to agree to a restraint on the licensee "not to grant sublicences 
or assign the licence."154 The comparable provisions in the two prede-
cessor regulations were Article 2(1) (5) of the Patent Regulation and 
Article 2(1) (2) of the Know-how Regulation. I55 Given the nature of 
patent monopoly and/or the leverage of possessing useful know-how 
technology, and absent statutory requirements, the patentee and/or 
the holder of know-how should be allowed to determine whether or 
not to transfer the technology at all, and if he chooses to do so, whether 
to allow the licensee to sub-transfer the technology to other parties. It 
is not uncommon in technology transactions for the licensor to refuse 
to grant any right to the licensee with regard to sublicensing or assign-
ment to parties unrelated to the principal transaction. 
151 See id. 
152Id. art. 2(1) (1). 
153 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(1); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1)(7). 
I54Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(2). 
155 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (2); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (5). 
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3. Post-Term Use Restrictions 
Article 2(1) (3) allows "an obligation on the licensee not to exploit 
the licensed know-how or patents after termination of the agreement 
in so far and as long as the know-how is still secret or the patents are 
still in force. "156 Similarly, Article 2 (1) (4) of the Patent Regulation 
permitted such a post-term use ban if the patent remained in force 
after the expiration of the agreement, while Article 2(1) (3) of the 
Know-how Regulation allowed such ban if the know-how remained 
secret. 157 It is the position of the Commission that the obligation on 
the licensee to cease using the licensed technology after the termina-
tion of the agreement "may be regarded as a normal feature of licens-
ing, as otherwise the licensor would be forced to transfer his know-how 
or patents in perpetuity. "158 The absence of permission for such a 
post-term use ban could discourage the licensor from licensing and 
"inhibit the transfer of technology. "159 
4. Reciprocal Grant-Backs 
The holders of patents and/or know-how technologies sometimes 
agree to license their technologies on the condition that the licensee 
simultaneously agrees to assign or license any improvement patents or 
know-how which may be subsequently developed or derived from the 
licensed technologies back to the original licensor. Agreements to that 
effect are called grant-back agreements or clauses. Grant-backs, espe-
cially mutual ones, may give rise to more innovations, and allow the 
licensor to license his or her patent or know-how without the risk that 
the technology in question ''will be foreclosed from the market. "160 In 
this sense, grant-backs may have the effect of increasing competition 
within the common market. 
Article 2 (1) (4) of the new Regulation thus allows the licensor to 
impose "an obligation on the licensee to grant to the licensor a licence 
in respect of his own improvements to or his new applications of the 
licensed technology. "161 This obligation is subject to two conditions. 
First, if the improvements are severable from the licensed technology, 
156Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(3). 
lSi See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (3); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (4). 
158Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (20). 
159 [d. 
160 Fogt & Gotts, supra note 24, at 25. 
161 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (4). 
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the license of such improvements must be non-exclusive "so that the 
licensee is free to use his own improvements or to license them to third 
parties," unless the licensee's own use or license of his or her improve-
ments would "involve disclosure of the know-how communicated by 
the licensor that is still secret."162 Second, the grant-back must be a 
reciprocal arrangement, i.e., the licensor, in requiring grant-backs 
from the licensee, must at the same time undertake "to grant an 
exclusive or non-exclusive licence of his own improvements to the 
licensee. "163 
It deserves mentioning that the conditions in the Regulation for the 
permissibility of grant-backs are somewhat different from those in the 
predecessor regulations and in the 1994 Draft Regulation. With respect 
to non-exclusivity, the new Regulation appears to have confined the 
licensor to that requirement only "in the case of severable improve-
ments," implying that if the improvements are not severable from the 
licensed technology, the licensor would not be subject to the non-ex-
clusivity requirement. 164 This reference to "severable improvements," 
however, could be found neither in the 1984 Patent Regulation, nor 
in the 1994 Draft Regulation. The Patent Regulation, while permitting 
an obligation on the parties to communicate to one another any 
experience gained during the course of exploiting the licensed patents 
and to grant one another a license with regard to any inventions 
involving improvements or new applications of the licensed patents, 
required the mutual grant-backs to be non-exclusive without distin-
guishing severable and non-severable improvements. 165 The 1994 Draft 
did not contain any reference to "severable improvements" when pro-
viding that the non-exclusivity requirement had to be satisfied. 166 While 
the 1989 Know-how Regulation did mention the word "severable," that 
word was referred to in a sub-context and could hardly be used to limit 
the words "non-exclusive license," which were contained in the cover-
all beginning sentence of Article 2 (l) (4) of the Know-how Regula-
tion. 167 Contrary to the plain structure and language of the new Regu-
lation, the Patent and Know-how Regulations and the 1994 Draft could 
all be properly interpreted to mean that the reciprocal grant-backs had 
162 [d. 
163 [d. 
164 [d. 
165 See Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (10). 
166 See 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, art. 2(1) (4). 
167 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (4). 
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to be non-exclusive irrespective of whether the improvements or new 
applications were severable from the originally licensed technology.16s 
Another difference between the new Regulation and the Patent and 
Know-how Regulations is that Article 2 (l) (4) of the new Regulation, 
unlike its predecessors, does not refer to any obligation on the licensee 
and vice versa to communicate any experience gained in the exploita-
tion of the licensed technology. log Further, the 1989 Know-how Regu-
lation permitted the licensor to require the licensee to seek a prior 
approval from the licensor before the licensee granted a license with 
respect to his or her improvements to any third party. 170 The licensor's 
prior approval could not be unduly withheld absent any justifiable 
reason to believe that the license of improvements would be likely to 
divulge the licensed know-how secrets. l71 This provision is not con-
tained in the new Regulation either. 
In addition, the Know-how Regulation contained a limitation on the 
licensor's right to grant-backs that would not allow the licensor to 
exploit those of the licensee's improvements that are not severable 
from the licensed know-how beyond the term of the principal licensing 
agreement. 172 The licensee could, however, waive this limitation by 
giving the licensor an option to continue using the improvements after 
the original agreement expired if the licensor himself or herself agreed 
to pay royalties for such continued use, or if he waived his or her own 
post-term use ban vis-a.-vis the licensee. 173 This limitation is absent in 
the new Regulation. The 1994 Draft Regulation provided a similar 
condition to the effect that the licensor, in addition to accepting other 
conditions, had to accept an obligation to pay appropriate royalties to 
the licensee when his or her right to exploit the licensee's improve-
ments would be of a duration longer than the licensee's right to exploit 
the technology supplied by the licensor.174 This provision has been 
deleted from the new Regulation. 
The new Regulation thus seems to underscore the requirement of 
reciprocity rather than non-exclusivity. As the Commission states in the 
preamble, "undertakings by the licensee to grant back to the licensor 
168 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (4); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (10); 1994 
Draft Reg., supra note 34, art. 2(1) (4). 
169 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(4). 
17oSee id. art. 2(1)(4)(a). 
171 See id. 
172 See id. art. 2(1) (4) (b). 
173 See id. 
174 See 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, art. 2(1) (4). 
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a licence for improvements to the licensed know-how and/or patents 
are generally not restrictive of competition if the licensee is entitled by 
the contract to share in future experience and inventions made by the 
licensor."175 It is notable that the same paragraph (with a different 
number) in the preamble of the 1994 Draft further stated that as a 
second condition the licensee ought to be allowed to retain "the right 
freely to use his own improvements or to grant licences to third parties 
where to do so would not disclose the licensor's know-how" in order 
to hold the grant-back arrangement not restrictive of competition. 176 
This second condition is not contained in the adopted text of the new 
Regulation. 
5. Minimum Quality Requirements/Tying of Necessary Goods 
Requirements with respect to minimum quality standards and/or 
the procurement and use of tied goods or services necessary for the 
proper exploitation of the licensed technology have been traditionally 
considered prima facie not within the scope of the prohibition of 
Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome. 177 They therefore have constituted 
permissible obligations, or at least exemptible obligations, if they were 
found to have an anti-competition effect. Article 2(1) (5) of the new 
Regulation continues to authorize "an obligation on the licensee to 
observe minimum quality specifications, including technical specifica-
tions, for the licensed product or to procure goods or services from 
the licensor or from an undertaking designated by the licensor ... and 
to allow the licensor to carry out related checks," provided that these 
quality specifications, products or services are necessary for (a) "a tech-
nically proper exploitation of the licensed technology," or (b) "ensur-
ing that the product of the licensee conforms to the minimum quality 
specifications that are applicable to the licensor and other licensees."17s 
This provision is virtually the same as Article 2 (1) (5) of the Know-how 
Regulation. 179 The Patent Regulation contained a similar but not iden-
tical provision. ISO If the licensor and other licensees observe certain 
minimum quality standards, or use certain goods or services in order 
to meet those standards, there appears to be no reason why the licensor 
175 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (20). 
176 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, recital (16). 
177 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (5); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1)(9). 
178Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (5). 
179 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(5). 
180 See Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2 (1) (9). 
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cannot also require the licensee to respect these standards or to pro-
cure those same goods or services in order to ensure the conformity 
of the licensed product to those minimum standards. Similarly, where 
the minimum standards or the tying of goods or services not covered 
by the licensed technology are in any way necessary for exploiting the 
licensed technology in a technically satisfactory manner, the require-
ment for such standards or tying would be justified. lSI 
6. Cooperation Respecting Misappropriation or Infringements 
The licensor under Article 2(1) (6) of the Regulation may also re-
quire the licensee (a) "to inform [him] of misappropriation of the 
know-how or of infringements of the licensed patents," or (b) "to take 
or to assist [him or her] in taking legal action against such misappro-
priation or infringements."ls2 It is not uncommon for the parties to 
draft into their licensing agreement an obligation on the licensee to 
cooperate with the licensor with regard to dealing with any infringe-
ment of the licensed patents or misappropriation of the licensed trade 
or technical secrets by third parties. The above provision is in essence 
a continuation and combination of the corresponding provisions in 
the prior Patent and Know-how Regulations. ls3 Unlike the new Regu-
lation, however, the prior regulations specifically did not allow the 
obligation to cooperate with respect to know-how misappropriation or 
patent infringements to be used to affect the licensee's right to contest 
the secrecy of the licensed know-how or to challenge the validity of the 
licensed patents. IS4 It is not known why this proviso was removed from 
the new Regulation. The licensee's right to contest the know-how's 
secrecy or the patents' validity appears, however, to be upheld in the 
new Regulation given the provisions of Article 2 (1) (15) .IS5 
7. Royalty Payments after Loss of Protectability of Technology 
Where the licensed know-how becomes publicly known for reasons 
other than through the action of the licensor, the licensor under 
Article 2(1)(7) of the Regulation is allowed to impose an obligation 
181 See Tritell & Lessor, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that such exemptions are "based on the need 
to ensure quality standards ... [and on the] rationale of ensuring a technically satisfactory 
exploitation of the licensed technology."). 
182Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(6). 
183 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (6); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (8). 
184 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(6); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (8). 
185 See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text. 
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on the licensee "to continue paying the royalties ... until the end of 
the agreement in the amounts, for the periods and according to the 
methods freely determined by the parties. "186 If the know-how becomes 
public knowledge "by the action of the licensee in breach of the 
agreement," the continued payment of royalties should not prejudice 
the licensor's entitlement to demand from the licensee "the payment 
of any additional damages. "187 This provision is basically the same as 
Article 2(1) (7) of the Know-how Regulation,188 but the Patent Regula-
tion contained nothing analogous. The Commission is of the opinion 
that the list of clauses in Article 2(1) "which do not prevent exemption" 
should also include "an obligation on the licensee to keep paying 
royalties until the end of the agreement independently of whether 
or not the licensed know-how has entered into the public domain 
through the action of third parties or of the licensee himself. "189 
Under Article 2(1)(7) of the new Regulation, the parties may also 
agree to an arrangement that would require the continued payment 
of royalties "over a period going beyond the duration of the licensed 
patents" if it is necessary or proper "to facilitate payment. "190 For 
instance, where the licensed patents have a remaining life of protection 
of seven years, an undertaking by the licensee, for the purpose of 
convenience or otherwise, to spread the payment of royalties over ten 
years instead of within the seven-year time limit is unlikely to produce 
any anti-competitive effect. The Commission believes that "the parties 
must be free, in order to facilitate payment, to spread the royalty 
payments for the use of the licensed technology over a period extend-
ing beyond the duration of the licensed patents ... " as, for example, 
" ... by setting lower royalty rates."191 This principle was stated in the 
1994 Draft Regulation with different wording.192 There was no compa-
rable provision in the 1984 Patent Regulation, nor in the 1989 Know-
how Regulation on this point. 
186Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(7)(a). 
187Id. 
188 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (7). 
189Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (21). 
190Id. art. 2(1) (7) (b). 
191Id. recital (21). 
192 See 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, art. 2(1) (7). The 1994 Draft Regulation states that 
nothing prevents the "royalties for the use of the licensed technology being spread, in order to 
facilitate payment, over a period going beyond the duration of the licensed patents or the entry 
of know-how into the public domain." Id. 
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It may further be noted that the 1994 Draft Regulation dealt with 
the exemptibility of the obligation of continued royalty payments "in 
the event of ... the [licensed] patents prematurely losing their validity 
other than by action of the licensor" or "by the action of the licensee 
in breach of the agreement" in the context not related to the use of 
spreading the royalty payments over a period beyond patent protec-
tion. 193 In the event that the licensed patents, prior to their normal 
expiration date, lost their protectability because, for instance, third 
parties or the licensee successfully challenged their validity, as a result 
of this provision of the Draft the licensee would nonetheless have been 
required to keep paying royalties until the end of the licensing agree-
ment-a result which would hardly be acceptable or justifiable. It 
appears to be a wise and applaudable decision of the Commission to 
exclude the situation of premature loss of patent validity in Article 
2(1) (7) of the new Regulation. 
8. Field-of-Use or Geographic Restrictions 
The licensor may find it in his or her best interest to limit the use 
of his or her patents and/or know-how to a particular field or fields of 
technical or market application even if there may exist other fields in 
which such patents and/or know-how are equally useful. Article 
2(1) (8) of the Regulation provides a classic exemption for "an obliga-
tion on the licensee to restrict his exploitation of the licensed technol-
ogy to one or more technical fields of application covered by the 
licensed technology or to one or more product markets. "194 This pro-
vision contains two types of distinguishable restrictions: technical 
fields-of-use restrictions and geographic or market application restric-
tions. 195 According to the Commission, these restrictions are "not 
caught by Article 85(1) either, since the licensor is entitled to transfer 
the technology only for a limited purpose. "196 The technical fields-of-
use restriction was covered by Article 2(1) (3) of the Patent Regulation, 
while both the technical fields-of-use restriction and the geographic 
application restriction were covered by Article 2(1)(8) of the Know-
how Regulation. 197 
193Id. 
194Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(8). 
195 See id. 
196Id. recital (22). 
197 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (8); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1)(3). 
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9. Minimum Royalty, Production or Use Requirements 
Article 2(1) (9) of the new Regulation permits the inclusion in a 
licensing agreement of "an obligation on the licensee to pay a mini-
mum royalty or to produce a minimum quantity of the licensed prod-
uct or to carry out a minimum number of operations exploiting the 
licensed technology. "198 This provision is similar to Article 2 (1) (2) of 
the Patent Regulation, and exactly the same as Article 2(1) (9) of the 
Know-how Regulation. 199 Under both regulations the licensor could 
equally impose minimum royalty, quantity and/or use requirements.2oo 
The licensor as the patentee and/or the holder of know-how naturally 
has an interest in ensuring that his or her economic expectation be 
realized at a minimum level out of the exploitation of his or her 
patented and/ or non-patented technology either by himself or herself 
or jointly through his or her licensees. A clause requiring the licensee 
to pay royalties at a minimum sum or rate, to produce the licensed 
product at a minimum quantity, or to exploit the licensed technology 
in a minimum number of operations may not necessarily cause the 
restriction of competition; rather, it may help create a chance of in-
creasing competition.201 If it does have an anti-competitive effect, the 
value it contributes to society by encouraging the use of new technol-
ogy and allowing consumers to share the benefits may provide a suf-
ficient counter-balance. On the other hand, if such a clause between 
competitors has "the effect of preventing the licensee from using 
competing technologies," the Commission is entitled to withdraw the 
benefit of exemption.202 
10. Most-Favored-Licensee Clauses 
The licensor may sometimes be compelled to render available to the 
licensee more favorable conditions or treatment which the licensor can 
offer to other licensees in the future. This kind of arrangement is 
sometimes referred to in legal literature as "MFN" or most-favored-na-
tion clauses, a term which is used in the wrong context.203 Indeed, such 
198Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(9). 
199 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (9); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1)(2). 
200 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2 (1) (9); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2 (1) (2). 
201 Cf Davis & Johnston, supra note 79, at 16. 
202Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 7(4). 
203 See, e.g., Anthony T. Cascio, Key Provisions for Technology Licensing Agreements, in TECHNOL-
OGY LICENSING 1987, at 159,161 (Gerald Sobel ed., 1987). 
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a clause can be properly called an "MFL" or most-favored-licensee 
clause.204 Such a clause is seldom found to be restrictive of competition, 
and has been always included in the Article 2 list of clauses which do 
not destroy the exemption even if they might fall within the prohibi-
tion of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.205 The new Regulation, in Article 
2(1) (10), thus allows "an obligation on the licensor to grant the licen-
see any more favourable terms that the licensor may grant to another 
undertaking after the agreement is entered into. "206 This language is 
identical to Article 2(1) (11) of the Patent Regulation and Article 
2(1) (10) of the Know-how Regulation.207 
11. Name or Patent Marking Requirements 
The licensee is sometimes required by the licensor to display the 
latter's name or patents on the products produced by the former in 
order to indicate the source of technology used for production of such 
products. The new Regulation in Article 2(1) (11) confirms the lawful-
ness of "an obligation on the licensee to mark the licensed product 
with an indication of the licensor's name or of the licensed patent."20S 
The corresponding provisions in prior laws were Article 2(1)(11) of 
the Know-how Regulation, which concerned the obligation to mark 
merely the licensor's name, and Article 2(1) (6) of the Patent Regula-
tion, which had a third alternative-the marking of the patent licens-
ing agreement on the licensed product.209 
12. Ban on Use of Technology to Benefit Third Parties 
The licensor may wish to prohibit the licensee from using the pro-
vided patents and/or know-how to construct facilities for competitors 
or for any other unrelated undertaking. Under Article 2(1) (12) of the 
new Regulation, it is permitted for the parties to agree upon "an obli-
gation on the licensee not to use the licensor's technology to construct 
facilities for third parties."210 This prohibition is without prejudice to 
204 See, e.g., Robert C. Kline, Key License Clauses, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 1987, supra note 
203, at 175, 177 (stating that "[t]he main purpose of an MFL clause is to provide a licensee with 
an option to obtain more favorable terms granted to a subsequent licensee."). 
205 See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
206 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(10). 
207 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (10); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (11). 
208Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(11). 
209 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(11); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (6). 
210Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(12). 
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the licensee's right "to increase the capacity of his or her facilities or 
to set up additional facilities for his own use on normal commercial 
terms, including the payment of additional royalties. "211 The Commis-
sion believes that the licensee "may lawfully be prevented" by the 
licensor from using the latter's specific patents and/or know-how "to 
set up facilities for third parties, since the purpose of the agreement 
is not to permit the licensee to give other producers access to the 
licensor's technology while it remains secret or protected by patent."212 
The Know-how Regulation contained a similar provision,213 but this 
matter was not dealt with in the Patent Regulation. 
13. Quantity Restrictions on Supplies to Given Customers 
The remaining items in the Article 2 (1) list of clauses not restrictive 
of competition are added features of the new Regulation which were 
not dealt with either in the Patent Regulation or in the Know-how 
Regulation. 214 Article 2(1) (13) of the new Regulation deals with restric-
tions on the quantity of the licensed product that may be supplied by 
the licensee to a given customer under appropriate circumstances.215 
It declares permissible and exemptible "an obligation on the licensee 
to supply only a limited quantity of the licensed product to a particular 
customer," but such restriction can be permitted only if accompanied 
with any of the following two situations: (a) "where the licence was 
granted so that the customer might have a second source of supply 
inside the licensed territory;" or (b) ''where the customer is the licen-
see, and the licence which was granted in order to provide a second 
source of supply provides that the customer is himself or herself to 
manufacture the licensed products or to have them manufactured by 
a subcontractor."216 This kind of agreement is distinguishable from 
customer sharing arrangements.217 The Commission is of the view that 
the general prohibition of customer sharing should not apply "to 
limitations on the quantities the licensee may supply to the customer 
concerned. "218 
2ll Id. 
212Id. recital (24). 
213 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(12). 
214 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(13)-(18). 
215 See id. art. 2(1) (13). 
216Id. 
217 See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
21SReg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (23). 
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The Patent Regulation did not contain any comparable provision 
regarding the restriction on supplies of the licensed product to a given 
customer. The Know-how Regulation did have similar provisions, but 
they were contained in the grey list, not the white list.219 That Regula-
tion recognized that the black-list ban of customer sharing did not 
apply to "cases where the know-how license is granted in order to 
provide a single customer with a second source of supply," nor to 
"limitations on the quantities the licensee may supply to the customer 
concerned. "220 It provided that these limitations could be individually 
exempted (rather than automatically) through the opposition proce-
dure under Article 4(2).221 Under the new Regulation, it is no longer 
necessary for the licensor or the parties to file an individual notifica-
tion in order to enjoy the benefit of exemption for the practices of 
limiting the quantity of supplies to a particular customer.222 
14. Licensee Best-Efforts Clauses 
Article 2(1) (17) concerns licensee "best-efforts" exploitation re-
quirements.223 It provides that the licensor may mandate that the licen-
see "use his best endeavours to manufacture and market the licensed 
product. "224 While this provision was not expressly included in Article 
2 of the prior two Regulations, licensee "best-efforts" clauses were 
permitted in different contexts. The Patent Regulation recognized 
"the legitimate interest of the licensor in having his patented invention 
exploited to the full and to this end to require the licensee to use his 
best endeavours to manufacture and market the licensed product. "225 
219 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, recital (18). 
220Id. 
221 See id. art. 4(2). Article 4(2) of the Know-how Regulation stated: 
Id. 
Paragraph 1 [i.e., the opposition procedure requiring notification] shall in particular 
apply to an obligation on the licensee to supply only a limited quantity of the licensed 
product to a particular customer, where the know-how licence is granted at the request 
of such a customer in order to provide him with a second source of supply within a 
licensed territory. 
This provision shall also apply where the customer is the licensee and the licence, in 
order to provide a second source of supply, provides for the customer to make licensed 
products or have them made by a su1x:ontractor. 
222 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(13). 
223 See id. art. 2(1) (17). 
224Id. 
225Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, recital (21). 
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It also provided that the prohibition in Article 3(3) which black-listed 
restrictions on competition did not apply to "an obligation on the 
licensee to use his best endeavours to exploit the licensed invention."226 
The Know-how Regulation, in Article 3(9), contained a similar provi-
sion.227 The new Regulation continues to provide that the prohibition 
of non-competition covenants under Article 3 (2) does not apply to the 
best-effort obligation referred to in Article 2 (1) (17).228 The express 
inclusion in the new Regulation of the licensee best-efforts require-
ment among the Article 2(1) list of permissible clauses229 is desirable 
as it enhances the certainty of the law on this point. Caution must still 
be exercised, however, with regard to the licensor's use of that legiti-
mate right. If "the parties were competing manufacturers at the date 
of the grant of the licence" and the best-efforts obligations referred to 
in Article 2(1) (17) "have the effect of preventing the licensee from 
using competing technologies," the Commission may withdraw the 
benefit of exemption of such obligations.23o 
15. Permissible Reservations of Rights 
Article 2(1)(14) through (16) and Article 2(1)(18) of the new Regu-
lation list a number of permissible reservations of rights which were 
either not dealt with or not white-listed in the prior Regulations. 231 The 
fact that a licensee is granted an exclusive or non-exclusive license to 
use the licensed technology within a defined territory inherently indi-
cates that the licensor has a right to prevent the licensee from using 
the same technology in other territories not so licensed to him or her. 
Article 2(1) (14) of the new Regulation thus permits "a reservation by 
the licensor of the right to exercise the rights conferred by a patent to 
oppose the exploitation of the technology by the licensee outside the 
licensed territory."232 There was, however, absolutely nothing compara-
ble in the two prior Regulations. The new Regulation involves the first 
time that this express authorization has been written into a block 
exemption regulation for technology licensing agreements. It is nota-
ble that this provision covers patented technology only, thereby exclud-
226Id. art. 3(3). 
227 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(9). 
228 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(2). 
229 See id. art. 2(1) (17). 
230Id. art. 7(4); see also Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 7(8). 
231 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (14)-(16), (18). 
232Id. art. 2(1)(14). 
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ing the opposability of exploitation by the licensee of know-how tech-
nology beyond the licensed territory.233 It is also notable that this 
provision does not confine the territories "outside the licensed terri-
tory" to those within the common market.234 This implies that the 
licensor may reserve the right to challenge the use of the licensed 
technology in non-EU territories such as in the United States. 
The reservation under Article 2 (1) (14) is similar to, but distinguish-
able from, the requirement that the licensee refrain from exploiting 
the licensed technology in the territories licensed to other licensees or 
reserved for the licensor himself or herself.235 The right contemplated 
by Article 2(1) (14) is a reserved right, not an immediately exercised 
one, i.e., it is not a direct obligation imposed on the licensee not to 
exploit the technology concerned in territories not within his or her 
scope of license.236 The licensee could arguably still engage in such 
exploitation unless and until the licensor subsequently exercises the 
reserved right to oppose such use. Further, by such a reservation, the 
licensor could oppose the use by the licensee of the licensed technol-
ogy not only in the territories of the licensor and/or other licensees, 
but also in territories within the common market which have not been 
licensed to any party, and territories outside the common market. 237 
Article 2(1) (15) authorizes "a reservation by the licensor of the right 
to terminate the agreement if the licensee contests the secret or sub-
stantial nature of the licensed know-how or challenges the validity of 
licensed patents within the common market belonging to the licensor 
or undertakings connected with him. "238 Patentees and/or holders of 
know-how are not permitted to prohibit their licensee(s) from contest-
ing the secrecy of the licensed know-how or the validity of the licensed 
patents;239 however, when the licensee does so contest or challenge the 
secrecy, nothing precludes the licensor from prematurely terminating 
the agreement. 24°This principle, while not having been explicitly white-
listed before, was stated in the two prior Regulations in a different 
way. 241 
233 See id. 
2341d. 
235 See id. art. 1 (1 )(3)-(6). 
236 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(14). 
237 See id. 
2381d. art. 2(1)(15). 
239 See infra notes 325-30 and accompanying text. 
240 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(15). 
241 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3 (4); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3 (1). 
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The licensor under Article 2(1) (16) of the new Regulation may also 
make a reservation of "the right to terminate the license agreement of 
a patent if the licensee raises the claim that such a patent is not 
necessary. "242 This is a completely new provision which was not dealt 
with in the prior Regulations. It is apparent that this permissible 
reservation is intended to apply to pure patent licensing agreements 
and mixed agreements involving the license of "necessary patents."243 
Nothing in the new Regulation precludes the licensee from raising 
questions with regard to the usefulness of a given patent to the entire 
licensed technology. This objection may take place when the licensee 
considers one or more of the patents in a pure patent-package license 
unnecessary for putting into effect the main licensed patents, or where 
he or she finds that one or more of the tied patents in a mixed 
agreement are not necessary for the exploitation of the licensed know-
how or other licensed technology. At the same time, the licensor may 
well reserve the right to terminate the licensing agreement when such 
objection arises.244 
Finally, Article 2(1)(18) permits the licensor to reserve the right "to 
terminate the [licensee's] exclusivity" and "to stop licensing improve-
ments" to the licensee in the event that "the licensee enters into 
competition within the common market with the licensor," with the 
licensor's affiliated undertakings, or with third parties, "in respect of 
research and development, production, use or distribution of compet-
ing products. "245 Further, the licensor may also reserve the right "to 
require the licensee to prove that the licensed know-how is not being 
used for the production of products ... other than those licensed. "246 
This provision was contained in the Know-how Regulation with respect 
to the black-listed non-competition clause under Article 3(9).247 
III. THE BLACK LIST: ARTICLE 3 
The new Regulation has shortened the black list of prohibited pro-
visions in comparison with those in the prior two regulations concern-
242Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (16). 
243 See id. 
244 See id. Where the licensor failed to reserve the right under Article 2(1) (16), however, he or 
she may presumably be precluded from terminating the licensing agreement simply because the 
licensee raises an objection. See id. 
245 [d. art. 2(1)(18). 
246Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (18); see also id. art. 3(2) (prohibiting non-competition 
clauses without prejudice to the licensor's right under Article 2(1)(8)). 
247 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3 (9). 
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ing patent and know-how licensing agreements. Among the restrictive 
provisions which are no longer black listed are the following: 
(1) no-challenge clauses;248 
(2) last-to-expire clauses covering newly obtained patents;249 
(3)obligations to pay royalties on unpatented products or 
divulged know-how;250 
(4) tying of products not technically necessary;251 
(5) post-term non-use covenants for know-how having become 
publicly known;252 
(6)exclusive and non-reciprocal grant-backs;253 
(7)grant-back licenses requiring the licensee, in connection 
with a post-term use ban, to grant back any non-severable 
improvements regardless of exclusivity and reciprocity if the 
248 See id. art. 3(4); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(1). In the new Regulation, this provision 
has been moved from Article 3 to Article 4, namely, from the black list to the grey list. See infra 
notes 325-30 and accompanying text. 
249 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(10) (black-listing clauses extending the duration of the 
license term by including improvements of know-how); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(2) 
(black-listing clauses extending the license term by including new patents). 
According to Article 8(3) of the new Regulation, a last-to-expire clause would nonetheless be 
exempted unless the licensee opposes to such an extension. Article 8(3) states: 
This Regulation shall furthermore apply to pure patent or know-how licensing agree-
ments or to mixed agreements whose initial duration is automatically prolonged by the 
inclusion of any new improvements, whether patented or not, communicated by the 
licensor, provided that the licensee has the right to refuse such improvements or each 
party has the right to terminate the agreement at the expiry of the initial term of an 
agreement and at least every three years thereafter. 
Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 8(3). 
250 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(5) (prohibiting charging royalties for the use of 
know-how that has entered into the public domain); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(4) 
(black-listing charges of royalties for non-patented products). 
251 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(3) (barring clauses requiring the licensee to accept 
unwanted and technically unnecessary licenses, goods or services); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, 
art. 3(9) (barring clauses requiring the licensee to accept unwanted and technically unnecessary 
licenses, goods or services). This tying practice is now covered in the grey list under Article 4. See 
infra notes 325-30 and accompanying text. 
252 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(1) (barring covenants preventing the licensee from 
exploiting the licensed know-how after the term of the agreement when the know-how has 
entered into the public domain other than by actions of the licensee). 
253 See id. art. 3(2) (black-listing an obligation on the licensee, in whole or in part, to assign or 
grant an exclusive license of his or her rights in improvements or new applications of the licensed 
technology to the licensor, which obligation would prevent the licensee from using his or her 
own improvements severable from the original licensed technology); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 
3, art. 3(8) (black-listing clauses requiring the licensee to assign the licensor in whole or in part 
his or her rights in patents for improvements or new applications of the licensed patents). 
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licensor's right under the grant-backs would be of a longer 
duration than the licensee's right under the know-how li-
cense.254 
Restrictions which are still included in the black list of Article 3 are 
the following: 
(1) price fixing by either party; 
(2) no-competition clauses; 
(3) restrictions on either party's ability to meet demand from 
users/resellers or parallel importers/exporters in licensed 
territories; 
(4) customer restrictions; 
(5) output restrictions on the licensed product; 
(6) mandatory assign-backs by the licensee; and 
(7) territorial exclusivity beyond permissible time limits.255 
A. Price Restrictions 
Article 3 of the new Regulation, in paragraph (1), continues to 
provide that the exemptions provided for in Articles 1 and 2(2) "shall 
not apply where . . . one party is restricted in the determination of 
prices, components of prices or discounts for the licensed products."256 
This provision is identical with Article 3(6) of the Patent Regulation 
and Article 3(8) of the Know-how Regulation.257 Price setting is the 
number one item listed in the prohibited practices under Article 85(1) 
of the Treaty of Rome, which declares it anti-competitive and thus 
makes it illegal to "directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices 
or any other trading conditions. "258 It is the Commission's position that 
price-fixing clauses or any other resale price restrictions should be 
black-listed because "they seriously limit the extent to which the licen-
see can exploit the licensed technology. "259 This explains why restric-
tions on the determination of purchasing or selling prices for the 
254 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3 (2) (c) (prohibiting clauses requiring the licensee, where 
the agreement also contained a post-term use ban, to grant back to the licensor a license for 
improvements which were not severable from the licensed technology, if the licensor's right to 
exploit the improvements would be of a duration longer than the licensee's right to exploit the 
licensed technology, even if the grant-backs are reciprocal and non-exclusive). 
255 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3. 
256Id. art. 3(1). 
257 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(8); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(6). 
258EEC TREATY art. 85(1)(a). 
259Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (24). 
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licensed products, as well as some other formerly forbidden practices, 
have not been, and can not be, removed from the black list. Further, 
unfair price fixing is also prohibited by the anti-abuse-of-dominant-po-
sition provisions of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome.26o On the other 
hand, price-suggesting should be distinguished from mandatory price 
restrictions. 261 The licensor or the licensee, absent any intention to 
impose and mandate price terms, should be free to recommend selling 
price guidelines to the other party. 
B. Non-Competition Covenants 
Clauses placing restraints on competition with the licensor, with the 
licensee, with their affiliated parties or with unrelated parties remain 
on the black list. Article 3(2) of the Regulation provides that the EU 
competition rules shall apply where: 
one party is restricted from competing within the common 
market with the other party, with undertakings connected 
with the other party or with other undertakings in respect of 
research and development, production, use or distribution of 
competing products without prejudice to the provisions of 
Article 2(1)(17) and (18).262 
This is almost identical to Article 3(9) of the Know-how Regulation.263 
The corresponding provision in the Patent Regulation is Article 3 (3).264 
This article arguably could be interpreted as banning non-competition 
clauses with respect to not only competing products but also the li-
censed product or its improvements, because it did not refer to the 
words "competing products" to limit the scope of impermissible non-
competition covenants. 265 The new Regulation, just as the Know-how 
Regulation did, makes it clear that it is with respect to competing 
products that non-competition clauses are prohibited.266 The words 
"without prejudice to the provisions of Article 2(1) (17) and (18)" refer 
260 See EEC TREATY art. 86(a). 
261 It appears that the Treaty of Rome and the new Regulation refer to, e.g., prices predeter-
mined by the licensor, not to recommended prices. In the latter case, the licensee would not be 
"restricted in the determination of prices." Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(1); see also EEC 
TREATY art~. 85(1) (a), 86(a). 
262 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(2). 
263 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(9). 
264 See Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(3). 
265 See id. 
266 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(2). 
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to two permissible practices which are white-listed in Article 2.267 De-
spite the Article 3(2) general prohibition of non-competition cove-
nants, the licensor is nevertheless not precluded (a) from imposing an 
obligation on the licensee to use his or her best endeavours to exploit 
the licensed technology, and (b) from exercising his or her right (i) 
to terminate the exclusivity, (ii) to stop communicating improvements 
to the licensee should the licensee enter into the type of competition 
with the licensor referred to in Article 3(2), and (iii) to require the 
licensee to prove that the licensed know-how is not being used for the 
production of competing products.268 
Because of the provisions of Article 2(1) (17) and (IS), and of Article 
2 (2), these practices are treated as not being restrictive of competition, 
and not requiring an individual notification for exemption if they are 
in fact causing an effect on competition.269 On the other hand, it can 
sometimes be difficult to draw a clear line between, e.g., a no-compe-
tition clause and a best-endeavor use clause insofar as their objective 
effects are concerned.270 A best-efforts obligation, which in itself is 
considered not inconsistent with the block exemption,271 is often fa-
vored and sometimes abused by the licensor. Requiring the licensee to 
use his or her "best endeavors" to manufacture and market the licensed 
product can have the effect of greatly reducing and even eliminating 
the licensee's ability to engage in research and development as well as 
production, use and distribution of different and competing products, 
and can also be questionable under Article 7 (4) if doing so would have 
the effect of preventing the licensee from using competing technolo-
gies. 272 
Another problem with the prohibition of non-competition clauses is 
that the Regulation and its predecessors fail to distinguish between 
intra-group and inter-group agreements as well as between vertical and 
horizontal agreements. Where a technology transfer agreement is be-
tween, for example, a U.S. parent company as licensor and a wholly-
owned subsidiary within the EU as licensee, the parent company may 
be said to have a legitimate interest in requiring the subsidiary not to 
engage in the development, production and marketing of products 
267Id. 
268 See supra notes 219-27, 241-42 and accompanying text. 
269 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (17), (18),2(2). 
270 Cf id. arts. 2(1) (17),3(2). 
271 See id. art. 2 (1) (17). 
272 See id. art. 7(4). 
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other than those licensed, and to have every reason to offer to the 
subsidiary no more protection than is necessary in order to induce 
investment. It appears, however, that a clause to that effect in a vertical 
transaction, even one between a parent company and its subsidiary, 
would still be barred, hardly justifiably, by the catch-all language of 
Article 3(2) of the present Regulation, even if "the transaction [that] 
is wholly vertical ... is unlikely to be anti-competitive."273 Indeed, in a 
vertical patent and/ or know-how licensing agreement between parties 
which are not already competitors or are even unlikely to become 
potential competitors, a non-competition clause would hardly have any 
anti-competitive effect, and could be 'Justified by the need to encour-
age a sole or exclusive licensee to exploit the technology."274 
C. Barriers to Parallel Trade 
Like Article 3(11) of the Patent Regulation and Article 3(12) of the 
Know-how Regulation, Article 3(3) of the new Regulation outlaws 
clauses under which "one or both of the parties are required without 
any objectively justified reason" to accept or place restraints on satisfY-
ing demand from users or resellers and on parallel trade, or to "do so 
as a result of a concerted practice between them. "275 More specifically, 
under Article 3 (3), neither the licensor nor the licensee may be man-
dated by such a clause "to refuse to meet orders from users or resellers 
in their respective territories who would market products in other 
territories within the common market. "276 Required or agreed refusal 
to meet the demand of users, resellers or parallel exporters has an 
anti-competitive effect and is incompatible with the block exemption 
unless it can be objectively justified in particular circumstances.277 
Further, neither party may be mandated to place impediments to 
parallel imports by making it "difficult for users or resellers to obtain 
the products from other resellers within the common market. "278 For 
example, neither party may exercise intellectual property rights or take 
other measures "so as to prevent users or resellers from obtaining 
outside, or from putting on the market in the licensed territory prod-
273Korah, supra note 77, at 266. 
274 [d. 
275 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, 3(3); Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(12); Reg. 2349/84, 
supra note 3, art. 3(11). 
276Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(3)(a). 
277 See id. 
27H See id. art. 3(3) (b). 
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ucts which have been lawfully put on the market within the common 
market by the licensor or with his consent."279 Artificial impediments 
to parallel importation can be anti-competitive in the same way as is 
refusal to meet the users' demand for parallel exports. Such parallel 
imports can be impeded only if accompanied with an "objectively 
justified reason. "280 
The language of Article 3(3) may in fact ease the prohibition on 
agreemen ts requiring the licensor or licensee to refuse to meet de-
mand from users in their territories who would resell within the com-
mon market by incorporating an objective justification defense. 281 
Whether a practice constitutes an objectively unjustifiable refusal to 
satisfY demands of resellers for parallel exportation may not be so easy 
to prove. On the other hand, Article 3(3) clarifies the prohibition on 
arrangements under which one or both parties are expected to make 
it difficult for parallel importers to obtain the licensed products from 
other resellers within the EU.282 This is accomplished by specifically 
black-listing the exercise of intellectual property rights or the adoption 
of other measures to prevent such importers from procuring outside 
the licensed territory products that have been lawfully marketed within 
the Community by the licensor, or from reselling such products so 
procured in the licensed terri tory. 283 
The exemption for territorial exclusivity under Article 1 does not 
grant the licensor or the licensee a right to prevent resellers from 
exporting or importing parallel licensed products.284 In accordance 
with a generally accepted doctrine prevalent in European countries, 
once such products are lawfully placed on the market by either party, 
that party's right to control such products is then considered to have 
become exhausted.285 As a consequence of allowing territorially exclu-
sive licenses which provide incentives for the use of new technology, 
general consumers "will be allowed a fair share of the benefit resulting 
from the improvement in the supply of goods on the market."286 On 
279Id. 
280Id. art. 3(3). 
281 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(3). 
282 See id. 
283 See id. art. 3(3) (b). 
284 See id. art. 1. 
285 See generally Kaoru Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative 
Analysis, 57 WASH L. REv. 433 (1982). 
28fiReg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (17). 
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the other hand, it is to protect the interests of consumers that the 
Commission believes that "it is right to exclude from the application 
of Article 1 cases where the parties agree to refuse to meet demand 
from users or resellers within their respective territories who would 
resell for export, or to take other steps to impede parallel imports. "287 
D. Customer-Sharing Clauses 
Customer restrictions are prohibited under Article 3 (4) of the new 
Regulation, which provides: 
[Block exemptions shall not apply where] the parties were 
already competing manufacturers before the grant of the 
licence and one of them is restricted, within the same tech-
nical field of use or within the same product market, as to the 
customers he may serve, in particular by being prohibited 
from supplying certain classes of user, employing certain 
forms of distribution or, with the aim of sharing customers, 
using certain types of packaging for the products, save as 
provided in Article 1 (1) (7) and Article 2(1) (13) .... 288 
The above rules outlawing customer-sharing clauses are rather strin-
gent and reflect the Commission's concern about customer and mar-
ket allocation arrangements which are thought to possess the potential 
for restricting competition and free trade within the common mar-
ket. 289 The Commission states that restrictions whereby parties who are 
competitors for the contract products "allocate customers within the 
same technological field of use or the same product market" should 
render the agreement ineligible for block exemption, no matter 
whether the allocation is achieved "by an actual prohibition on supply-
ing certain classes of customer or through an obligation with an equiva-
lent effect .... "290 
The comparable provisions in the prior laws are Article 3(7) of the 
Patent Regulation and Article 3(6) of the Know-how Regulation.291 
287 Id. 
288Id. art. 3(4). 
289 See, e.g., Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, recital (16) (stating that field of use restrictions may not 
constitute a disguised means of customer sharing); 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 34, recital (18) 
(similarly prohibiting "customer allocation" in the disguised form of field of use restriction). 
290 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (23). 
291 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(6); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(7). 
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However, neither provision in the prior laws confined the prohibition 
of customer restrictions to agreements between competitors.292 Further, 
the Patent Regulation simply prohibited customer sharing arrange-
ments without any reference to a relevant field of use or product 
market. Under the new Regulation, the Article 3(4) prohibition of 
customer allocation applies only to arrangements between parties 
which were already competitors at the time when their licensing agree-
ment took effect. 293 Customer restrictions between parties which were 
not already competing manufacturers are not per se black-listed, al-
though they remain subject to individual assessment by the Commis-
sion, in particular under the opposition procedure.294 In addition, the 
prohibition on customer restrictions under the new Regulation, like 
under the Know-how Regulation, is explicitly limited to a given tech-
nical field of use or a given product market. 295 
E. Output Limitations 
The new Regulation continues to black-list clauses aimed at impos-
ing output restrictions by providing, in Article 3 (5), that the block 
exemption does not apply where "the quantity of the licensed products 
one party may manufacture or sell or the number of operations ex-
ploiting the licensed technology he may carry out are subject to limi-
tations, save as provided in Article [1]( 1 ) (8) and Article 2 (1 ) (13) . "296 
The Commission believes that output restrictions should be outlawed 
not only because they limit the extent to which the licensee may exploit 
the licensed technology, but also because they "have the same effect as 
export bans."297 This provision is in essence the same as Article 3(5) of 
the Patent Regulation and Article 3(7) of the Know-how Regulation. 298 
However, Article 3(5) of the Patent Regulation did not contain any 
"save" exception.299 The "save" exceptions in Article 3(5) of the new 
Regulation, with reference to Articles 1 (1) (8) and 2(1) (13), would 
allow quantity restrictions when the licensed products are used to 
manufacture or market the licensee's own and different products, and 
292 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(6); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(7). 
293 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(4). 
294 See infra notes 318-53 and accompanying text. 
295 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(4). 
296Id. art. 3(5). 
297 Id. recital (24). 
298 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(7); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(5). 
299 See Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(5). 
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would also legalize restrictions on the supply of the licensed products 
to a particular customer if the terms of the license itself were intended 
to allow that customer access to an alternative supplier in the licensed 
terri tory. 300 
The Know-how Regulation referred to both exceptions. 301 The latter 
one, which regarded the restriction on the quantity of the licensed 
products which the licensee could supply to a particular customer, was 
listed on the Article 4 grey list. 302 It required individual assessment by 
the Commission through the opposition procedure.303 In contrast, this 
same restriction is white-listed under Article 2 of the present Regula-
tion. 304 The common point in both the new Regulation and the Know-
how Regulation is that quantity restrictions on the supply to a given 
customer are not automatically outlawed.305 The Commission recog-
nizes that the Article 3 black list should not apply to such a type of 
quantity restriction.306 
F. Compulsory Assign-Backs 
Article 3(6) of the new Regulation still prohibits clauses whereby 
"the licensee is obliged to assign in whole or in part to the licensor 
rights to improvements to or new applications of the licensed technol-
ogy. "307 The corresponding provisions in the two prior laws are Article 
3(8) of the Patent Regulation and Article 3(2) (a) of the Know-how 
Regulation.30s It has always been the Commission's position that "a 
restrictive effect on competition arises" in circumstances involving 
mandatory assignment of all or a part of the improvements to the 
originally licensed technology back to the licensor.309 
Unlike the Know-how Regulation, the new Regulation does not spe-
cifically black-list obligations on the licensee to grant the licensor an 
exclusive license for improvements which are severable from the li-
censed technology, if such grant would prevent the licensee from 
300 See supra notes 193--96, 216--18 and accompanying text. 
301 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(7). 
302 See id. art. 4(2). 
303 See id. 
304 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(13). 
305 See id. art. 2(1) (13); Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 4(2). 
306 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (23). The Know-how Regulation contained no com-
parable statement in the recital section. 
307Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(6) (emphasis added). 
308 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(2) (a); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 3(8). 
309Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (20). 
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exploiting his or her own improvements himself or herself and/or 
from licensing such improvements to third parties.310 Also absent in 
the new Regulation, but contained in the Know-how Regulation, is the 
specific prohibition of clauses requiring the licensee to grant back to 
the licensor a license, even if non-exclusive and reciprocal, for im-
provements which are not severable from the licensed technology, 
where (a) the licensor prohibits the licensee from using the licensed 
technology beyond the term of the agreement and (b) the licensor 
under the grant-backs would have a longer duration to exploit the 
licensee's improvements than the licensee's time limit to exploit the 
licensed technology.311 Although they are eligible for automatic block 
exemption, the removal of these two grant-back practices from the 
black list indicates that they are no longer deemed to be automatically 
impermissible, i.e., illegal per se. 
Article 2 (1) (4) of the new Regulation white-lists grant-backs of li-
censes, but not assignments, of improvements as long as they are 
two-way arrangements.312 In order for such reciprocal grant-backs to be 
eligible for automatic block exemption, it is not necessary for them to 
be non-exclusive if the improvements are not severable from the li-
censed technology; non-exclusivity is required only in the case of sev-
erable improvements so as to allow the licensee to use or license such 
improvements.313 It follows that non-mutual grant-backs, or non-exclu-
sive grant-backs involving severable improvements, constitute question-
able but not automatically prohibited practices, the exemption of 
which will be subject to individual notification to, and assessment by, 
the Commission.314 
G. Territorial Exclusivity Beyond Permissible Durations 
Finally, Article 3(7) of the new Regulation prohibits clauses whereby 
the licensor is required not to license other parties to exploit the same 
technology in the licensed territory, "albeit in separate agreements or 
through automatic prolongation of the initial duration of the agree-
ment by the inclusion of any new improvements, for a period exceed-
ing that permitted under Article 1 (2) and (3) .... "315 It also prohibits 
310 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(2)(b). 
3ll See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(2) (c). The Article 3 black list of the new Regulation 
does not contain an equivalent of Article 3(2) (c) of the Know-how Regulation. 
312 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(4). 
313 See supra notes 157-74 and accompanying text. 
314 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 4(1). 
315Id. art. 3(7). 
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clauses whereby either party is required not to exploit the same tech-
nology in the other party's territory or the territory of third licensee(s) 
for periods exceeding those permitted under Articles 1 (2) and (3) or 
Article 1(4).316 Article 1(2) through (4) sets forth various time limits 
of block exemptions for different obligations respectively within the 
categories of pure patent licenses, pure know-how licenses and mixed 
agreements.317 
The above provision of Article 3(7) is basically the same as Article 
3 (11) of the Know-how Regulation. 318 The relevant provision in Article 
3(10) of the Patent Regulation, however, merely outlawed clauses 
which required the licensee not to passively put the licensed products 
on the market in territories licensed to other licensees for a period of 
time exceeding the permissible time limit, namely, longer than five 
years after the products were first put on the market by the licensor or 
any of his or her licensees.319 In contrast, the new Regulation, like the 
Know-how Regulation, prohibits all types of arrangements that would 
extend any type of exempted territorial exclusivity beyond the permis-
sible duration under Article 1 (2), (3) or (4), i.e., not only with regard 
to prolonged restrictions on passive selling in other licensee's territo-
ries, but also with regard to any other prolonged exclusive territorial 
restrictions exceeding the permissible time limits.320 
IV. THE GREY LIST: ARTICLE 4 OPPOSITION PROCEDURE 
The new Regulation, like the Patent and Know-how Regulations, 
continues to provide, in Article 4, a so-called opposition procedure for 
agreements containing the so-called grey obligations.321 These may be 
individually assessed and approved by the Commission, or may become 
exempted simply because of a failure to oppose such obligations by the 
Commission within a given period of time.322 Article 4 merely lists an 
illustrative and non-exhaustive grey list of practices suitable for the 
opposition procedure. In appropriate cases, any practices that are 
neither white-listed nor black-listed but are nevertheless restrictive of 
competition may by implication be considered part of the Article 4 
316 See id. 
317 See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text. 
318 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(7); Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(11). 
319 See Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, arts. 1(1)(6), 3(10). 
320 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 3(7). 
321 See id. art. 4. Grey obligations are obligations restrictive of competition which are neither 
explicitly covered by the white list block exemptions of Articles 1 and 2 nor directly prohibited 
by the black list in Article 3. 
322 See id. art. 4(1). 
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grey list. Under the Article 4 opposition procedure of the prior two 
Regulations, parties could notifY the Commission of such agreements 
or obligations, which would then be considered approved or individu-
ally exempted if the Commission took no action to oppose exemption 
within six months.323 That reviewing period has been dramatically re-
duced to four months in the new Regulation, which represents another 
important change.324 The new Regulation provides: 
The exemption provided for in Articles 1 and 2 shall also 
apply to agreements containing obligations restrictive of com-
petition which are not covered by those Articles and do not 
fall within the scope of Article 3, on condition that the agree-
ments in question are notified to the Commission ... and 
that the Commission does not oppose such exemption within 
a period of four months.325 
The Commission believes that obligations or practices which are not 
automatically covered by the exemption because they are not explicitly 
exempted by the Regulation nor specifically excluded from exemption, 
"including those lsited [sic] in Article 4(2) [of the Regulation], may, 
in certain circumstances, nonetheless be presumed to be eligible for 
application of the block exemption. "326 It believes it is "possible for the 
Commission rapidly to establish whether this is the case" for a particu-
lar agreement; and that agreements notified to the Commission which 
contain such obligations should be "deemed to be covered by the 
exemption provided for in this Regulation where ... the Commission 
does not oppose the application of the exemption within a specified 
period of time,"327 which is now four months. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 then provides an illustrative and non-ex-
haustive grey list of practices that are covered neither by the white list 
323 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 4(1); Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 4( 1). 
324 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 4(1). The four month reviewing period for the Commis-
sion runs from the date when the notification referred to above takes effect in accordance with 
the terms of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 3385/94, i.e., from the date on which the 
Commission receives such notification, or from the postmark date where the notification is sent 
by registered mail. See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 4(3); see also Commission Regulation 
3385/94 of 21 December 1994 on the Form, Content and Other Details of Applications and 
Notifications Provided for in Council Regulation 17, arts. 1-3, 1994 OJ. (L 377) 28, 28-29. At 
the maximum, the EC Commission has a period of four months within which it may oppose the 
exemption. See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 4(3). 
325Id. 
326Id. recital (25). 
327Id. 
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nor by the black list, but are appropriate for application for exemption 
under the opposition procedure.328 The examples so listed concern the 
tying of quality specifications, licenses, goods or services which are not 
technically necessary, as well as no-challenge or no-contest clauses.329 
Article 4(2) states: 
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply, in particular, where: 
(a) the licensee is obliged at the time the agreement is en-
tered into to accept quality specifications or further licences 
or to procure goods or services which are not necessary for 
a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed technol-
ogy or for ensuring that the production of th(· licensee con-
forms to the quality standards that are respect ~ j by the licen-
sor and other licensees; 
(b) the licensee is prohibited from contesting the secrecy or 
substantiality of the licensed know-how or from challenging 
the validity of patents licensed within the common market 
belonging to the licensor or undertakings connected with 
him.330 
It should be kept in mind that restrictions on the quantity of supplies 
to a particular customer, which were specifically grey-listed under Ar-
ticle 4(2) of the Know-how Regulation, are no longer subject to the 
requirements of the opposition procedure; rather, such restrictions are 
covered by the white list in Article 2.331 The Patent Regulation did not 
even contain any examples of practices potentially exemptible through 
the opposition procedure. Also notable is the fact that tying and no-
contest clauses, which are now specifically "up-graded" to the grey list, 
were both black-listed under the prior Regulations. 332 Given the broad 
coverage of Article 4(1) and the illustrative nature of Article 4(2), it is 
safe to assume that all those clauses and practices which were formerly 
specifically forbidden under either the Patent Regulation or the Know-
how Regulation or both, and which are no longer on the black list 
under the new Regulation but are not automatically exempted either, 
328 See id. art. 4(2). 
329 See Reg. 240/96. supra note 1, art. 4(2). 
330Id. 
331 See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text. 
:132 See Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 3(3) (tying), 3(4) (no-contest covenants); Reg. 2349/84, 
supra note 3, art. 3(1) (no-contest covenants), 3(9) (tying). 
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are eligible for the potential benefits of being exempted through the 
opposition procedure.333 
A Member State of the EU may request the Commission to oppose 
an exemption, and such a request must be justified on the basis of 
considerations relating to EU competition rules.334 Should there be 
such a request from a Member State, the Commission must then 
oppose the exemption within two months after the notification is 
transmitted to that Member State.335 Where the Commission opposes 
the exemption within four months absent any request to do so from a 
Member State it may "at any time" withdraw its opposition.336 Should 
the Commission oppose the exemption, however, at the request of a 
Member State it may withdraw the opposition "only after consultation 
of the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant 
Position," a committee responsible for opinions with regard to the 
enforcement of Articles 85(1) and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.337 Should 
the opposition be withdrawn because the parties have shown that the 
conditions of Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome are fulfilled, the 
exemption shall apply retroactively from the date of the notification.338 
Should, however, the Commission withdraw its opposition because the 
parties concerned have amended the agreement in such a manner that 
it now falls within the scope of Article 85(3), the exemption will apply 
only from the date when the amendment takes effect.339 
CONCLUSION 
From the point of view of industries and businesses, the new block 
exemption Regulation in its approved form is a laudable development 
in two major senses. First, the new Regulation has dramatically cur-
tailed the Article 3 black list, expanded the white list, especially in 
Article 2, and at the same time removed clauses which were formerly 
grey-listed as examples from Article 4 to the white list of Article 2.340 
Secondly, the Commission has made an important compromise to 
333 Compare Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 4(1), (2); with Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 4(1), 
(2) and Reg. 2349/84, supra note 3, art. 4(1), (2). 
334 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 4(5). 
335 See id. 
336Id. art. 4(6). 
337Id. 
338 See id. art. 4 (7) . 
339 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 4(8). 
340 Compare id. arts. 2-4 with Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, arts. 2-4 and Reg. 2349/84, supra note 
3, arts. 2-4. 
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industries by finally agreeing to remove from the new Regulation 
proposed provisions on the 40% market share thresholds which it 
attempted to introduce into the new law. 
On the other hand, parties to a technology transfer agreement 
cannot simply sit back and relax merely because their agreement in 
whole, or in most part, comprises white-listed provisions. For one thing, 
the Commission reserves the right to withdraw the benefit of block 
exemption in cases where it finds that any of the exempted provisions 
in effect do not meet the conditions of Article 85(3) of the Treaty of 
Rome. For another, should the agreement contain both white-listed 
and non-white-listed provisions, the parties may need to take caution-
ary steps in order to avoid being caught by the Commission in accord-
ance with Article 85(1) .341 
The curtailing of the black list and the expansion of the white list 
are consistent with the object of allowing the licensor and licensee 
wider latitude to structure their agreements for the transfer of tech-
nology without cutting back the legal certainty of block exemption for 
legal and permissible provisions and practices. Some formerly black-
listed provisions, such as the last-to-expire clause covering improve-
ment patents and/or know-how, are not only removed from the black 
list, but are also eligible for block exemption and de facto inclusion in 
the white list. 342 Two formerly black-listed practices, tying arrangements 
and no-contest clauses, are now included in the grey list of Article 4 as 
illustrations of potentially permissible practices. Still some formerly 
prohibited practices are no longer black-listed-they are simply nei-
ther white-listed, nor specifically mentioned in the grey list. 
Since the Article 2 white list and the Article 4 grey list are both 
non-exhaustive, those practices which are now "liberated" from Article 
3 may in special circumstances find their way into either category-the 
grey list or even the white list. It is at least safe to say that obligations 
or practices which have been removed from the black list may all 
receive the benefits of Article 4(1) that would enable them to be 
exempted if the Commission fails to act within four months after they 
are notified, or two months after the notification is transmitted to a 
Member State which requests an opposition from the Commission. It 
341 Even where an agreement is completely exempted from Article 85(1), it may nevertheless 
fall under Article 86 should any of its provisions essentially result in an abuse of dominant position 
by any of the parties. See, e.g., Case T-5l/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, [1990] II E.GR. 
309, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 334 (1990). This issue, however, is outside the scope of this article. 
342 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 8(3). For the full text of Article 8(3), see supra note 249. 
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is also arguable that a clause which is no longer black-listed may be 
considered, in proper cases, among the inclusive white list of Article 
2. Moreover, restrictions on the quantity of supplies received by a 
particular customer, and such supply restrictions where the customer 
is the licensee, which were both included as examples in the Article 4 
grey list of the Know-how Regulation, have been "up-graded" into the 
Article 2 white list. Should this trend continue, the possibility remains 
for more formerly black-listed practices which are now covered by the 
grey list, as well as those which were and continue to be covered by the 
grey list, to become specifically permitted practices under the white list 
in the future, if the Commission reconsiders or amends the new Regu-
lation. For the most part, these changes were already reflected in the 
1994 Draft Regulation and its earlier versions. It was commented about 
the draft that 
The significance of these changes goes beyond their pro-
posed removal from the Black List of these block exemptions. 
The Commission has rarely granted individual exemptions 
for practices on the Black List; thus, these changes may signifY 
a more general liberalization of the Commission's approach 
to the type of restrictions that would no longer be Black 
Listed.343 
The non-inclusion of the previously proposed 40% market share 
thresholds in the new Regulation indicates that the Commission has 
effectively backed down from its prior position and modified its block 
exemption drafts in an effort to work out, in a practical way, something 
that industries can accept. The idea of introducing the thresholds was 
originally based on the Tetra Pak case involving the abuse of dominant 
position by a Swedish packaging company.344 Industries contested that 
the prior two block exemptions had generally worked well and that 
apart from the Tetra Pak case, there had not been any significant case 
involving the abuse of dominant position.345 Protests from, and consult-
ation with, industries have also revealed the lack of evidence about the 
block exemption being abused by companies other than Tetra Pak.346 
As Fiona Marcq of the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confedera-
tions of Europe (UNICE) remarked: "Our cooperation with the Com-
343 Tritell & Lesser, supra note 22, at 2. 
344 See generally Tetra Pak, [1990] II E.C.R. at 309. 
345 See Industry Heralds Victory, supra note 2. 
346 See id. 
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mission on this instrument has finally achieved something that is ac-
ceptable to industry .... We no longer have any problems. "347 
While the Regulation is designed to provide legal certainty for tech-
nology licensing provisions, it continues to authorize, as the prior two 
Regulations did, the Commission to withdraw the benefit of the ex-
emption if, in particular circumstances, the agreement has certain 
anti-competitive effects "which are incompatible with the conditions 
[for exemption] laid down in Article 85(3) of the Treaty."348 The 
Commission may be particularly likely to find such effects where: (a) 
the agreement shields the licensed products from effective competi-
tion from identical or substitutable products in the licensed territory, 
especially where the licensee's market share would exceed 40%; (b) 
the licensee refuses to meet unsolicited orders from resellers outside 
of the licensed territory absent any justifiable reason; (c) the parties 
undertake to create impediments to legitimate parallel trade; and/or 
(d) the licensor, in requiring the licensee to produce a minimum 
quantity or to use his or her best efforts to exploit the licensed tech-
nology, uses the agreement to prevent a formerly competing licensee 
"from using competing technologies. "349 One may find it hard to com-
prehend why it is necessary to refer to the obligation or concerted 
practice of impeding legitimate parallel exportation and importation 
in Article 7, given the fact that such obligation or practice has already 
been black-listed under Article 3 (3) .350 
Finally, the issue remains unsettled as to whether the presence of 
one or more black-listed clauses in an agreement invalidates the entire 
agreement or just those clauses which are specifically prohibited. The 
new Regulation does not provide a clue. It does state in recital (25) 
that an agreement that is "not automatically covered by the exemption 
because [it] contain [s] provisions that are not expressly exempted" is 
eligible for application of the block exemption.351 A judge who is 
conservative is more likely than not to interpret this statement this way: 
if an agreement as a whole is "not automatically covered by the exemp-
tion" simply because it includes grey-listed clauses, then one may have 
347Id. 
34H Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 7. Cf Reg. 556/89, supra note 4, art. 7; Reg. 2349/84, supra 
note 3, art. 9. 
349 See Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, art. 7(1)-(4). 
350 See supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text. 
351 Reg. 240/96, supra note 1, recital (25). 
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more reasons to conclude that an agreement containing black-listed 
clauses is not automatically exempted in its entirety, either.352 
On the other hand, a liberal judge may find that recital (25) does 
not mean that the entire agreement is "not automatically" exempted 
when it contains grey-listed (i.e., not specifically exempted) clauses; 
rather, it merely refers to the non-automatic exemption of the agree-
ment insofar as those grey-listed provisions are concerned, not the 
remainder of the agreement. By the same token, a liberal judge is likely 
to conclude that an agreement as a whole will not be invalidated simply 
because some of its clauses or provisions are black-listed, and that as 
long as it contains provisions which are expressly exempted by the 
white list, those provisions should nevertheless be covered by the ex-
emption. This latter interpretation would be consistent with a pro-
posed provision contained in an earlier version of the new Regulation, 
the May 1994 draft, which provided that where an agreement con-
tained both clauses which were exempted and those which were not, 
the block exemption would still apply to those clauses that were cov-
ered, while the remaining clauses would be subject to Article 85 (1) of 
the Treaty.353 While such an express provision is not contained in the 
new Regulation, it appears reasonable that a category of clauses should 
not in itself affect the status of another category. An agreement which 
embodies white-listed clauses as well as grey-listed and/or black-listed 
clauses should be considered automatically covered by the exemption 
insofar as it concerns the white-listed clauses only, unless such grey-
listed and/or black-listed clauses in whole or in part are inseparable 
from the remainder of the agreement. In any event, where a proposed 
licensing agreement does contain permissible, questionable and pro-
hibited provisions, the parties are advised to delete or revise the pro-
hibited provisions-the Commission has rarely granted individual ex-
emption for black-listed practices-and then notify the Commission of 
the entire revised agreement in accordance with the opposition pro-
cedure of Article 4. 
352 See id. 
353 See May 1994 Draft Reg., supra note 77, art. 4. 
